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
September 1988

A SOVIET WEEKLY
OF WORLD AFFAIRS


NEW TIMES

A 20-year
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
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
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
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33. Klyuzha garmen nishcheg na kuy
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With Gorbachev's seven new security proposals for Asia and the Pacific, Krasnoyarsk follows in the wake of Vladivostok. pp. 5,6.

Siberia and perestroika. After the Krasnoyarsk discussions. p. 20

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**NEW TIMES MEETS
ITS READERS**

Front cover: a fragment of the
picture "Fundamental Lexi-
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OPINIONS

Jordan Gavrilov Chochov,
lawyer, member
of the Communist Party,
Stanke-Dimitrov, Bulgaria

■ Perestroika is the social renewal I have been waiting for over thirty years. I hoped and still hope that it will help us comprehend the meaning of the lives and deaths of millions of fighters for social progress and communism. But I am worried about the course of perestroika, because officialdom still has the opportunity to retain its dominant position.

The socialist state in the Soviet Union was deformed to such an extent in the 1930s that worker-peasant power became the power of the bureaucracy. The main purpose of perestroika is therefore to deprive the bureaucrats of power and the right to dispose of state property as their own.

Mikhail Gorbachev was right when he said at the recent Party conference that the Central Committee will not achieve anything by starting to dismiss bureaucrats again, because "we have tried to do many things from above and nothing has come of it."

Indeed, nothing will be achieved without the people, who should unite and take

power from the bureaucrats — each in his own place of work. Otherwise, there is a danger of revolutionary perestroika being reduced to mere cosmetic reforms.

Vyacheslav Malakhin
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

■ Not long ago I read an interesting article in your magazine by Vladilen Burov on reforms in China. It is gratifying that journalists no longer exclusively emphasize negative aspects of life in China, as was the case in the recent past. The establishment of friendly ties between our countries in many fields, personal contacts

included, can only be welcomed. It is in this connection that I have decided to write to you.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s I began as a schoolboy, to correspond with a Chinese boy of my own age. He lived in Shanghai and his name was Shang Jingen. I learned many new things from him about China and his native town. Though our correspondence lasted three years, we did not have a chance to meet.

Shang has remained in my memory as one of my closest friends. Over a quarter of a century has passed since then. Both of us are over forty. I wonder if he remembers our schoolboy friendship. Could you help to find my old friend by publishing this letter?

CARRYING ON THE DISCUSSION

A. Lisovsky
Naberezhnyie Chelny, U.S.S.R.

■ I disagree with the assessment of Stalin as a "dual personality" in the sense that he did the country good as well as harm. One sometimes reads in the newspapers that Stalin had an erroneous concept of socialism, but that he interpreted it in his own way. I entirely disagree with this view as well.

It is surprising that Stalin failed to understand the fundamental principles of socialism after so many years of contacts with Lenin. Stalin was not a fool. He simply had one goal — absolute power, and he moved steadily towards it, trampling the Party and the state apparatus underfoot, turning public institutions into mere formalities, and depriving the people wholesale of their rights.

He also practised similar methods in the Communist International, which he virtually directed, thereby causing irreparable damage to the international communist movement. Stalin abused people's faith in the Party and their desire to build socialism, and took advantage of the lack of bourgeois democratic experience and the political illiteracy of the masses. He was building his own dictatorship, not

socialism, and however he is portrayed, he remains a dictator.

Winfried Fischer
Stockholm, Sweden

■ Many of my friends and I myself have a high opinion of new Soviet journalism born in the time of perestroika and glasnost. But I have noticed a disparity between what is printed in your pages and the real state of affairs. You write with inspiration and hope of concrete changes and further progress. But, if we face the truth, there are still few real changes. I have in mind free travel abroad, your passport system, and much else.

But the news media have an obligation to identify the wishes of the people, stimulate them and, perhaps, to some extent realize them. This is probably where all the changes needed by your country begin. I think New Times is acting in just this spirit, and therefore, I give preference to it.

Sergei Vatisov,
aged 20
Kovylkino, Mordovia, U.S.S.R.

■ You continue to pass over many topical themes. For instance, the magazine could publish an article about "dissi-

dent" individuals and organizations and hold a debate with them, for the truth is born in argument, and in our time we need pluralism as we need fresh air.

A. Matyushkin
Leningrad, U.S.S.R.

■ I agree with the main provisions of Valery Chichkanov's article "Those devious generalities" (issue 32). The past few decades have seen both an obvious and hidden growth of prices. The results are sad, and could not be good. No price manipulations will create new goods. The essential goods will appear when proper order and justice are established in the economy and in remuneration. Why raise the average wage if you can't buy what you want with the money available now?

It is necessary first of all to set fair wage rates for different categories of working people. There would be no problems in hospitals if nursing assistants received a wage equal to the average pay in industry. There would not be discontent amongst technicians or engineers if their salaries did not constitute a small proportion of the wages of the workers they supervise. At the same time, the salaries of some categories of managerial personnel are obviously excessive.

Valery Pochepko,
Cand. Sc. (Philos.),
member of the Communist Party
Leningrad, U.S.S.R.

■ I read with interest the articles that fill in the blanks in our recent history. In issue 32, under the rubric The past and the present, I read the article "The 20th Party Congress" by the Soviet historian and philosopher Roy Medvedev, who, incidentally, is better known abroad than here in the U.S.S.R. The magazine should be commended for the direct political rehabilitation of this writer and his work.

Roy Medvedev shows why it was necessary for Khrushchev to deliver his "secret speech"

GLASNOST

at the congress session on February 25, 1956. The reader can also guess what was that speech about. But why not publish Khrushchev's "secret speech" in full? This could open up the way for the democratization of our society and weaken the bureaucratic hierarchy in the Party and the state.

Khrushchev's feat will live on in the memories of the post-Stalin generations. Today, in the age of glasnost and democratization, we are witnessing a new, fuller and more objective interpretation of the tragedy of the personality cult. However, I have not yet seen theoretical articles that lay bare the roots of Stalinism and explain why it came to exist.

Roy Medvedev's article might be instrumental in understanding the background of what we call the stagnation period.

Ahmed Ustarkhanov, veteran worker, Erpeli Village, Daghestan, U.S.S.R.

■ In his letter V. Lukashov (see Glasnost, issue 29) is concerned about the consequences of the new policy of our state towards the church and religion. I am sure our leadership has displayed not only wisdom but also courage by understanding the need to make use of all levers for improving our society in the name of peace. It is only natural that the policy of new political thinking has touched religion too. We say that the Earth is our common home. But in this home there are not a few believers whose confidence in us atheists has a favourable effect on the solution of global problems.

I am sure that believers should be respected and taken account of, and then we can expect them to act nobly

for the triumph of good. There is nothing surprising about the fact that the Italian Communist Party has Catholics in its ranks. Marxism is not a dogma. The leadership of the Italian party evidently weighed the pros and cons before taking this step.

I think that in the modern world religion is not an enemy of socialism, and the church is not to blame for the mistakes made in the past.

REPERCUSSIONS

FROM THE EDITORS: In his letter published in issue 23, W. Gilbert of France, writes of the problems he encountered after buying a Soviet-made Lada-Samara car. Below we publish a reply from the foreign trade firm AvtoLada in Togliatti.

■ Dear Mr Gilbert,

Judging from what you write, our specialists have, on the whole, produced a modern car with a fairly high technical and economic performance. At the same time, a number of problems always arise in the process of exploitation, and the specialists at our plant are working systematically to eliminate them. In particular, measures have already been taken with regard to the problems mentioned in your letter. Lada-Samara cars will now have high-voltage wires, a better-designed pump for the windscreen wiper, a new, more reliable electronic ignition unit (commutator) and, thanks to technological improvements, leaks from the engine and gear box have been removed.

Moreover, the plant cooperates extensively with importers in organizing a proper maintenance service for Lada cars in the respective countries. In France, Lada cars are imported by Poch S.A. We deeply regret that the concessioner to whom you applied repaired your car so inefficiently. You understand that it is difficult for us to give correct

technical recommendations from Togliatti. Therefore, if you consider it necessary, you can apply to our specialist I. Okrugov at Poch S.A., who will give you technical assistance. For our part, we shall instruct him accordingly.


FROM THE EDITORS: Simultaneously with this reply the magazine received another letter from W. Gilbert.

■ Thank you for publishing my letter. I did not even hope for it, thinking it could do harm to your country. But you are right: similar occurrences can only be avoided in the future by making them public.

In my previous letter I forgot to point out that all the breakdowns happened after the car had covered only 6,000 kilometres. My bad luck has continued since then: I barely escaped an accident for the third time when the starter broke.

I want to add that I have been a subscriber to New Times for several years and value it highly. As the process of perestroika and glasnost develops, the magazine is becoming increasingly interesting. The information published in your weekly seems more reliable than my Lada-Samara car.

AN ARTIST'S COMMENT



Drawing by Garif Basyrov



**ALEXANDER
GELMAN,**
playwright,
U.S.S.R.

The most important event at the moment is, in my opinion, the reports and election campaign in the Party. Meetings are being held to hear reports and elect Party branch leaders and delegates to district conferences, who will, in their turn, elect district Party leaders and delegates to regional conferences. In fact, the composition of the Party leadership at local level is now being determined for the next five years, the most crucial period of perestroika.

Personally, I am worried about the way these meetings are being held and the obvious lack of attention to them on the part of public opinion and the media. I remember how high passions ran during the election of delegates to the Party conference. And now it seems to be all peace and harmony. The present campaign is very important, as it will essentially decide what kind of people will soon be elected delegates to the 28th Party Congress. Equally disturbing is the fact that the instructions adopted for the present campaign effectively prescribe the old electoral procedure, which hampers the renewal of Party leadership from the bottom up and, in my view, is not compatible with the resolutions passed by the 19th Party conference.

Preparations for the 19th conference revealed to Party members the attitude of some Party workers to democratic changes in our society. This raised hopes that the composition of Party bodies would be radically renewed in the present campaign. But can it be renewed in an atmosphere in which active public opinion has clearly been damped?



**MURSI
NUWEISHI,**
Editor-in-
Chief of the
Egyptian
weekly Anba
al-Ushu

For me, the main event of the past few days is to do with my country. I have in mind President Mubarak's visit to Iraq, his meetings with Saddam Hussain, and the conclusion of agreements on further economic cooperation between the two countries.

The fighting between Iraq and Iran ended recently. The issues that both sides are expected to face after the cease-fire could prove more complex than the war itself. I think the new agreements between Egypt and Iraq will help resolve them.


The visit of our President means, in my view, a further consolidation of Egypt's ties with the Arab world after a period of comparative isolation. My country's foreign policy is directed towards a just settlement of the

Middle East problem in the interests of the Arab people of Palestine.

On the other hand, we want to strengthen peaceful cooperation both with our Arab brothers and the great powers, including the Soviet Union and the United States. Pursuing this course, we have already been able to remove the obstacles in the way of friendship and cooperation between Egypt and the Soviet Union.

In May and June I took part in an international peace cruise on the Dnieper River. It was during that time that we began to discuss this mode of river peace cruise and what we might do differently on this peace cruise from previous ones. We had a hope that we would be working in small groups, and that the focus of these groups would be individual participants showing their own likes or dislikes, without any thematic topics. During the international cruise on the Volga River, however, its 200 participants again focussed on thematic groups. But, I think, the themes were OK: citizen diplomacy, spiritual ecology, mothers and children, family problems and, of course, ecology.

The discussion on ecological issues was perhaps the most interesting and lively. It became particularly fruitful when participants discussed issues from the human point of view, stressing what it means to a person seeing the Volga being polluted or, as an American participant said, what environment pollution means to the U.S. citizens, how they react to the destruction of the earth layer, and what effect it will have on their country. Such discussions help people to become well acquainted with each other, and, I think, the motorship Maxim Gorky is an ideal place for this purpose.



**BILL
SHAW,**
President of the
Crosscurrents
International
Institute, U.S.A.,
a member of
the Volga cruise
"For peace,
security and
environment
protection"

Time for action: the Krasnoyarsk initiatives

*Professor
Vladimir Lukin*

Mikhail Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk speech is a milestone in promoting the Vladivostok principles to ensure all-Asian security. The seven concrete proposals set out by the Soviet leader are, in effect, our answer to the lively discussion evoked by the Vladivostok initiatives. They have been made with an eye to our partners' comments both favourable and adverse. For instance, we've often heard the reproach that the demand for the closure of the American military bases in the Philippines was followed by a promise to "respond in kind." Now, we are extremely specific about it: we are prepared, with our Vietnamese friends' consent, to stop using the naval material and technical supply base in Cam Ranh Bay. So it's a showdown. Now the ball is in our partners' court.

The air has also been cleared as regards the issue of the radar station near Krasnoyarsk. We want to brush all the speculation about it aside and go a long way towards an agreement on strategic matters. It has been suggested that the Krasnoyarsk radar station be used as the basis for international cooperation in gearing space research to peaceful purposes, and that it be incorporated into the system of the World Space Organization, the idea of which has been accepted in authoritative Western quarters. On the other hand, we need more light on points where the Americans tend to be vague (Greenland and the United Kingdom.) This was stated in Krasnoyarsk in no uncertain terms.

In his Krasnoyarsk speech Gorbachev dwelt on the new character of our relations with China over the past two years. The negotiation mechanism has been developed, and is now in dynamic action. It presupposes periodic consultations on basic foreign policy issues and negotiations on frontier problems, to be conducted in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere. And, last but not least, consultations on the acute Kampuchean issue, which still divides us. In fact, the word "divides" should be used in the past tense. Today we see eye to eye on certain aspects of the issue. All this makes a Soviet-Chinese summit a realistic proposition.

Attention has been drawn to the fact

that our relations with another great Asian Pacific power, Japan, are still far from adequate. We are in dialogue, certainly. What's more, this dialogue has intensified, especially on the informal level. However, the Japanese side is still blocking a practical settlement of the so-called territorial issue by laying a claim to the four Southern Kuriles. A hope was expressed in Krasnoyarsk that the Japanese side would take steps at last to get our relations off the ground in the interests of a better future. The Soviet Union, too, will work towards this end.

There is certainly good reason to be cautiously optimistic about the development of our relations with the ASEAN countries. These countries have ceased to be diplomatically exotic to us over the past few years. Dialogue with them has become routine diplomatic practice. Unfortunately, it has not as yet entailed any substantial radical changes in our economic relations with them.

Our foreign policy activity in the Asian Pacific region must be placed on an appropriate economic and material basis and backed by a vigorous development of foreign trade. This last should become

The seven proposals by Mikhail Gorbachev in furtherance of the Vladivostok Programme

- The Soviet Union will not increase the number of nuclear weapons of any type in the Asian-Pacific region and calls upon the United States of America and other nuclear powers not to deploy additional nuclear weapons in this area.
- We invite the basic naval powers of the region to enter into consultations on the non-increase of naval forces in this area.
- We propose discussion on a multilateral basis of the question of scaling down the military confrontation in areas where the coasts of the U.S.S.R., the P.R.C., Japan, the D.P.R.K. and South Korea come in close proximity to one another, with the object of freezing and reducing proportionately the level of naval and air forces, and limiting their activity.
- If the U.S.A. agrees to dismantle its military bases in the Philippines, the U.S.S.R. is ready, in agreement with the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, to relinquish its material-and-technical naval supply base in Cam Ranh Bay.
- In the interests of the safety of naval and air communications in the region, we propose the joint working out of measures for the prevention of incidents in the open sea and the airspace over it.
- We propose convening, not later than 1990, an international conference to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.
- We propose the discussion at any level and with the participation of all who wish it, of the question of creating a negotiating mechanism for the examination of our own and any other proposals relating to the security of the Asian-Pacific region. This discussion could be begun by the U.S.S.R., the P.R.C. and the U.S.A. as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

the flagship, as it were. A good ship can only be built in a good shipyard. Therefore we have to build our Far Eastern "shipyard" as soon as possible.

Two years separate Gorbachev's Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk speeches. In July, 1986, the groundwork was laid for our long-term strategic concept of turning full face to the Pacific. The past few years have shown that the need for such a turn is becoming increasingly pressing for our country from year to year, even from month to month. The same period has also demonstrated the difficulty of achieving this.

We know from past experience that speed is of vital importance. But we are also aware of the truth of the adage "more haste, less speed." We have certainly made a rush job of the long-term programme for the comprehensive development of the productive forces of the Far Eastern economic region, our draft home policy aimed at reaching the Asian Pacific Region (APR). Adopted a year after the Vladivostok speech, compiled by ministries and for ministries, the programme was in fact these ministries' answer to the perennial question of how to change everything without changing anything. The programme is based on the "more of same" principle. More of what has no market in the APR now and stands even less chance of having any at the turn of the century. This is a "gross" programme of enormous but empty "paper investments" described as capital investments, a programme which proved untenable within a year of its adoption. In sum, it offers no means of filling the ever growing gap between our economic potential and that of the APR countries. This programme could be different if discussed not in the privacy of an office, but publicly, openly, with scientists and practical workers from the Far East and Moscow invited to take part.

The seven points of the Krasnoyarsk speech, which are to form the basis of the "favourable foreign trade regime" for Siberia and the Far East, certainly go a long way towards improving the situation with regard to the activation of our more rewarding and dynamic practical contacts with the APR countries. That is, unless these points are diluted and depreciated by all kinds of ministerial instructions and "practical

interpretations," as was often the case before. Of great importance in this context is the suggestion that a regional body for the coordination of foreign trade contacts be set up in the Far East. This body will be efficacious only if vested with real powers, in other words, if it replaces administrative departments rather than adds another one to them. Otherwise, confusion and a struggle for control stifling local initiative may ruin all the bold ideas.

It is commonly admitted today that our Pacific policy in the period between Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk has been active, vigorous and constructive. The task now is not merely to shift emphases, but to translate general political slogans and initiatives into action. Our progress along this line both in domestic economic life and in foreign policy will help consolidate the new positive image of our country, which is clearly taking shape east and southeast of our borders. The consolidation of this positive image will open up new foreign policy horizons for us.

The world's response to Mikhail Gorbachev's speech can be described as extremely interested and, at the same time, varied. This variety came, I think, from the official American assessment of the speech. The gist of these assessments is that nothing meriting attention, let alone any new moves, has taken place.

It's a safe guess that Washington's stand is prompted by the fact that in its last months in office the present administration avoids any sharp turns. Yet the U.S. political elite feels that the country may find itself in diplomatic isolation in the region if such turns are shunned. We will probably get no concrete response to the Krasnoyarsk proposals before the new U.S. Administration takes over. But even in this case a Soviet-U.S. dialogue on APR issues is imminent, and we must be ready for it.

After weeks and months of confrontation between the population and the ruling Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) the army, led by the Defence Minister, has taken over

By the middle of last week Burma seemed to be surmounting the crisis; fear of the man with the gun was gradually subsiding and the opposition, who now included deserting soldiers and police in their ranks, were more orderly. To normalize the situation in Rangoon, democratic militants had taken steps to stop looting and marauding. The authorities had gradually given in to the mass opposition movement and all that now remained was to meet the final demand at once to set up an interim government, which would organize and hold a multi-party general election.

However, the calm was deceptive. The outcome of the complex political infighting depended first and foremost on the stand taken by the army. President Maung Maung's government was no longer in control, his authority having been reduced to the heavily-guarded central apparatus. In Burma's second largest city, Mandalay, the local administration had resigned. Out on the periphery, democrats were increasingly taking over administrative functions. Like a ripe coconut, power was about to fall, but into whose hands was not yet clear.

The "big four," as popular opposition leaders Aung San Suu Kyi, U Nu and the two retired generals Tin Oo and Aung Gyi are being called here, were seen as the principal claimants to power. The most influential member of the quartet is Suu Kyi, daughter of the national hero Aung San, the acknowledged leader of the Burmese national liberation movement who was killed shortly before the country became independent. Despite apparent isolation from Burmese life, Suu Kyi, who lived and studied for some time in the U.K., surprisingly enough soon became extremely popular – a fact to which not only her father's image, but also student backing contributed. No wonder the ruling regime saw her as their most dangerous rival. She is calling for the prompt formation of an interim govern-

BURMA


The army takes over

ment, and is supported by former Defence Minister Tin Oo, and by Aung Gyi, a leader of the 1962 coup.

Brigadier Aung Gyi, who in recent years had become an enterprising and successful businessman, was the first to stir up the stagnant morasse of the one-party bureaucracy. In fact, the countrywide mass demonstrations against the government can be traced to his open letters to Ne Win – which have been widely circulated this year – denouncing the BSPP regime's socio-economic policy and reprisals against dissidents and students.

Collaborating with U Nu, the trio, by virtue of their united and consistent action, already got Dr Maung Maung to meet most of their demands. All that remained was the immediate formation of a provisional cabinet capable of holding democratic elections. However, they did not appear to have a definite plan as to how to achieve this.

For some time the Burmese army remained a silent bystander, even though factories and transport had stood idle for weeks on end, petrol stocks were running low, and a fortnight ago banks



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and government institutions had shut their doors. Though the government no longer had any real authority, the opposition, while consistently calling for an immediate interim government, did little in practice to form one.

On September 18, General So Maung, the Defence Minister in the BSPP cabinet and chief of staff of the Armed Forces, announced the setting up of a "state committee for

establishment of law and order" comprised solely of military. A curfew has been imposed in Rangoon and elsewhere, and the government departments created over the past 26 years, including Parliament and the Council of Ministers, have been dissolved. All factory workers and civil servants have been ordered to return to work by September 26. Officially, the new regime is for a multi-party system and democratic elections, but only after peace and order return to Burma and normal transport and food supplies have been assured. Meanwhile, the organization of parties adhering to democratic norms has been authorized, with an eye to preparations for future elections. However, all meetings, speeches and gatherings of more than five persons have been banned.

Despite all these severe measures, in Rangoon throughout the night of September 18 crowds of people, mostly youngsters, felled trees to block streets and alleys and put up barricades. By the morning of September 19 Rangoon was completely paralyzed.

It is now clear that opposition leaders have been in consultation for some time to draft a statement acceptable to everyone on the latest events. Meanwhile, in central Rangoon the army has fired on a peaceful demonstration. Blood is again being spilled in Burma.

Alexei Romanov and Yuri Olgin

RANGOON, September 20

NEW TIMES 39.88 7

No violence, no bloodshed

Aung San Suu Kyi in an exclusive New Times interview



What we want is a system acceptable to the majority of the people of Burma. My view of the situation is that since the majority is so united in the feeling that they simply do not want a one-party system any more, they must have an interim government in which they have confidence. Only an interim government can solve the problems. That's the only way out of this crisis.

Unless a government has the confidence of the people, nothing will work. Now everybody is on strike and all the major government departments are. They can't get anything going, but if an interim government comes and receives the consent of the people, we can start solving the country's problems.

The people are now getting more and more impatient. But there must be no violence, no bloodshed. It's best to achieve our goals by peaceful means alone.

Light at the end of the tunnel

It looks as if the U.N. has its day: the current trend towards the easing of international tensions has set its mighty peacemaking mechanism in motion.


Under the auspices of the U.N. – the universal world forum – a number of negotiations are under way over the most threatening seats of international tension. They are yielding increasingly successful results. This process was set in motion by the Geneva accords on Afghanistan.

At last the turn appears to have come for Cyprus, the seat of one of the most protracted conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean which has now been dragging on for 25 years. Negotiations between the leaders of the Greek and the Turkish communities, Georgios Vasilou and Rauf Denktas, were resumed in Nicosia on September 15. The talks were the second round in the series, which was launched in Geneva on August 24-25 and which was being energetically mediated by U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar in the framework of the U.N. mandate. Incidentally, the Peruvian diplomat has taken a particular interest in the island since the late 1970s, when he was Kurt Waldheim's special representative in Cyprus. In Geneva, the two leaders voiced their readiness to hold further talks, without any preconditions, to progress towards achieving a mutually acceptable agreement covering all aspects of the Cyprus problem by June next year. Now the meeting has taken place, not at the world's end, but in Ledra-Palace, in the centre of Nicosia, formerly a hotel and now the residence of the U.N. representative in Cyprus, Oscar Camilion. The palace is in the buffer zone known as the Green Line which stretches right across the island like a 180-kilometre-long snake.

The meeting started with handshakes and protocol smiles, with the "blue helmets" as a guard of honour. These were the soldiers of Major General Günther Greindl of Austria, commander of the U.N. Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus.

President Georgios Vasilou of Cyprus came to the meeting armed with impressive moral backing. The recent non-aligned conference at ministerial level, which was held in the Greek part of Nicosia, had earned moral and political support for his government and

*Alexei
Bukalov*



**U.N.
guides
Cyprus to a
settlement**

called for the peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem. As for Rauf Denktas, only the Ankara government recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus he proclaimed in 1983. The sole safeguard for the "republic's" sovereignty is the 30,000-strong Turkish contingent which landed there 14 years ago. Some 50,000 Turkish settlers have since arrived in Cyprus. The most challenging problem facing the talks is what should happen first: a peace settlement or Turkish troop withdrawal.

A number of factors have a bearing on the way in which the intercommunal talks are progressing – the U.S. stand, determined by its concern for the security of NATO's south-eastern flank, the proximity of the strife-torn Arab region and the current negotiations on Turkey's admittance into the European Community in which context the Turkish government has to take into account the EEC's disapproval of the use of force in solving ethnic conflicts.

The Cypriot intercommunal contacts have been improved by the Greek-Turkish dialogue launched in the Swiss town of Davos and later continued in Athens and Ankara.

There is some common ground for the talks which is indicated by Georgios Vasilou's statement that nobody in the southern part of Cyprus is seeking enosis (political union with Greece). Enosis is extremely disturbing to Turkish Cypriots. The idea of a federal republic in the island, comprising two states, seems to be gaining ground in principle with both sides. It would be premature to go into detail, however.

The intercommunal dialogue will continue in New York, while the 43rd U.N. General Assembly is in session. This proposal was made by Perez de Cuellar and supported by the leaders of both communities. A representative international conference on Cyprus within the framework of the U.N. could also prove an important step towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem. It was in January of 1986 that the idea of such a conference was suggested by the Soviet Union. Since that time it has gained not a few supporters, among them many in Cyprus itself.

In short, were it not happening on a warm Mediterranean island, one might say that the ice has been broken. Some feasible approaches to a solution to the Cyprus question have emerged, to serve the interests of all Cypriots, Greeks and Turks alike, and the cause of common European security.

NICOSIA-MOSCOW



The "Saharan wall" that the U.N. wants to pull down

Having sponsored talks between Iraq and Iran, Perez de Cuellar is now going to tackle the Western Saharan conflict in the hope that it can be settled through U.N. mediation by the end of this year.

The construction of the great Chinese wall lasted for centuries. The giant structure, more than 4,000 km long, was intended to protect China against its enemies.

In our time this experience has been used, at a modern level, in Western Sahara. For seven years or so a wall roughly 2,500 km long has stood there. It is composed of sandbanks piled two to three metres high by bulldozers. On top of them are radars to pinpoint enemy movements. Mine beds have been laid beyond the wall. Barbed wire, watch towers, underground bunkers, heavy machine guns, mortars, artillery guns, electronic eyes, light amplifiers, metal and person

nel intrusion detection systems with an effective radius of several kilometres isolate the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).


The wall in the Western Sahara was completed last year. The territory west of the wall, including the Atlantic coast, is held by Morocco. According to information provided by the SADR, Morocco has under its control 47,000 sq. km, with the total area of Western Sahara being 266,000 sq. km. According to other data, 80 per cent of SADR's territory is occupied by Morocco.

The wall is also now becoming a formidable obstacle in the way of forming a union of the Arab countries in North Africa, known as Great Maghreb.

The Spanish legacy

The Western Saharan conflict, like any other, has its prehistory. The rivalry between Portugal and Spain in the seizure of land in that part of North Africa began as far back as the 14th-15th centuries. However, it was Spain that finally succeeded in establishing colonies there.

The whole region of North Africa was divided between imperialist powers early this century, with Britain taking control of Egypt, Italy of Libya, and France of Tunisia, Algeria and part of Morocco. Spain received the southern part of Morocco and Western Sahara. In sub-



sequent years the spheres of influence were slightly redrawn.

We know that imperialist powers did not part with their colonies of their own will. The national liberation struggle acquired the character of a popular war, and Western Sahara was no exception in this respect. For instance, the mass uprising in 1957 was put down by Spain with French aid. It took both countries almost a year of joint military operations and ruthless bombing to crush the resurgence of the anti-colonial war.

In 1960, the United Nations adopted an Indian-sponsored Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples. However, it was only 15 years later that Spain withdrew from its colonial possessions in North Africa. Madrid was forced to do so because the anti-colonial struggle in Western Sahara had assumed an organized character.

In May 1973, a Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro, known as Polisario, was set up under the leadership of 28-year-old El-Ouli Mustapha Sayed, who was later killed in combat. One of the co-founders of the front was its present secretary-general and President of the SADR, Mohammed Abdelaziz.


In the history of Western Sahara three significant dates are observed in succession: on February 26, 1976, Spain renounced its colonial possession of Western Sahara; on February 27, 1976, Polisario announced the founding of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, and on February 28, 1976, the last Spaniards left the former colony.

But the proclamation of independence and the republic did not bring peace to the country. Mauritania and Morocco laid claim to the territory of the former Spanish colony. In 1975 the two countries applied to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, claiming their right to Western Sahara following the expected evacuation of the Spanish. The International Court turned down their request and ruled that Western Sahara should be granted the right to self-determination.

But the International Court's ruling was ignored, and in November 1975 Spain, Morocco and Mauritania signed an agreement in Madrid on dividing Western Sahara between the two last-named countries. Immediately after it was proclaimed, the SADR had to fight on two fronts – against Mauritanian and Moroccan

troops. Military operations assumed a fierce character. It was reported that even napalm bombs were being used against Polisario. Many people fled to neighbouring Algeria. About 100,000 refugees settled in camps there. The total number of refugees is now estimated at 165,000.

The war took on a protracted character. It led to a military coup in Mauritania and armed clashes between Morocco



Moroccan exploitation of phosphate deposits is going full blast in Western Sahara.

and Algeria, which began to support the Western Sahara Front. The protracted fighting proved too onerous for the Mauritanian economy. Following a coup staged by the army in 1978, the military administration of that country concluded a peace agreement with the SADR and renounced all claims to Western Sahara.

But Morocco continued the war. King Hassan II repeatedly declared that Western Sahara was part of his kingdom. It was contended that the tribal chiefs in the disputed territory had long been vassals of the Moroccan dynasty.

The problem of Western Sahara has been discussed several times by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. There seems to be one way out of the impasse – holding a referendum among the Saharan people to decide whether they want to be part of the Kingdom of Morocco or citizens of the independent Saharan Arab Democratic Republic.

The two conflicting parties backed the idea of a referendum, but each of them put forward its own terms. The SADR demands that the Moroccan troops leave

the occupied territory for the duration of any referendum and that the country's future be decided at direct talks between Polisario and King Hassan II. For its part, Morocco considers that only civilians should take part in the referendum, to be held in the presence of its troops, and objects to direct talks with Polisario.

The U.N. Secretary-General faces a difficult task. He has to find a compromise acceptable to both sides, a com-

promise that will ensure the expression of the free will of the people.

The poor desert rich in mineral deposits

Supporting the idea of a referendum in principle, each party seems to count on success. But let us not jump to conclusions and forecasts because the situation is not all that simple.

Western Sahara is mostly a desert where temperature can shoot up to 57 degrees centigrade by day, while at night it falls as low as freezing. A terrible sand storm, called the *Irifi*, sometimes sweeps across the desert, and even the tough Bedouins fear it. There is hardly any vegetation as we understand it, except for prickly shrubs growing here and there and vegetation on the banks of the only river, the Saguia el-Hamra. In some places one sees neolithic paintings on rock showing elephants, giraffes and rhinoceri: Millennia ago the Sahara was fertile. Today water has to be extracted from a great depth. People live in small oases round artesian wells. Major towns, including the republic's capital El-Ayoun, are situated on the Atlantic coast.

Passions over Western Sahara would hardly have flared up had the overall picture been as dismal as the foregoing. The world's largest deposits of phosphate, estimated at ten billion tons, were discovered there in 1947. In the 1950s deposits of iron ore containing titanium and vanadium were found in the country.

Such resources could turn the desert

into a garden, as has happened in some of the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf. That is why the question of ownership is so important. At present the SADR is cut off from these natural resources by the above-mentioned wall, and its indigenous population is compelled to eke out a miserable existence in tents.

Meanwhile Morocco is losing no time exploiting the phosphate deposits in the occupied territory. It has invested over a billion dollars on building an infrastructure in the region. Housing construction is going full blast, and towns are springing up on the sites of former villages. The local people are being provided with jobs. At the same time there is a massive inflow of Moroccans into the area.

The cost of living in the occupied territory is considerably lower than in the Kingdom, while wages are higher. The most essential foodstuffs, for instance, cost only half as much as in Morocco. The Kingdom is not stinting on Western Sahara, whose population has been tax exempt for ten years, is being provided with rent-free housing, and enjoys free education and medical care.

Only 13 years ago Laayoun had a population of 25,000, while today more than 100,000 people live there. Its harbour has been turned into an ocean port, through which Morocco is beginning to export phosphate mined at the Bou-Craa deposit.

No wonder many local people are not particularly worried by the fact that their native land is under the rule of King Hassan II. Only a fair U.N.-supervised referendum will show whether they want independence from it.

The threshold to be crossed

The economic situation in Morocco is better than in other countries in North Africa. King Hassan II hopes to improve it by exporting phosphate from Western Sahara. But so far Morocco has been putting more into the area than it has been taking out of it.

Roughly a billion dollars is being spent annually on the war, and about 250,000 men have been called up for combat service in Western Sahara.

Polisario is waging a war of attrition without suffering substantial losses of

its own. At night its fighters approach the wall, drawing enemy fire. As a rule Moroccans expend their ammunition in vain, as fighters do not enter the dangerous zone. Sometimes they make a surprise attack, inflicting significant losses on the Moroccans, as happened in the area of Imoddagan-Lahmar last year.

All this goes to show that the war between the SADR and Morocco could last a long time. The King's opinion that the SADR represents a minority of the Western Saharan population can no longer be a consolation to him, as the Republic has been recognized by 71 states – members of the U.N. As in other protracted conflicts, negotiations and referendum seem the only way to peace.

The referendum should be con-

ducted under U.N. supervision, the more so as in the Moroccan-occupied part of Western Sahara it is now rather difficult to distinguish the native population from the Moroccans. But these difficulties can be overcome if there is good will.

Resolving the problem of Western Sahara will open a real path to the establishment of Great Maghreb. It is the last threshold to be crossed. The other countries of Maghreb are already cooperating successfully. Even Algeria restored diplomatic relations with Morocco not long ago. Let us hope that the U.N. Secretary-General's efforts towards a settlement of the Western Saharan conflict will prove fruitful. There is no alternative but peace.

Dmitry Zgersky

In a camp near Tindouf

A capacious landrover is the best means of transport by which to reach the Western Saharan refugee camps some 20 km from the Algerian town of Tindouf. Turning off the asphalted road, our car passed a military post flying a SADR flag and drove to the rows of tents in which the refugee families live. Some tents are of the type used in the army, while others are makeshift black yurt-style structures of sheep's and camel's wool. Desert nomads usually live in them.


It is impossible to count the tents, because upwards of 165,000 people live in the camp zone. However, life is well organized there, and everything is taken into account. The camp town is divided into four districts – wilayats – named after towns in Western Sahara: El-Ayoun, Dakhla, Aoussert and Smara. For instance, Smara wilayat comprises 30 camps with a population of roughly 34,000. The governor of Smara is a woman, Senniya Ahmed, one of the 27 Polisario politbureau members.

The first impression of life in the camp I visited was oppressive: sand all around, terrible heat in summer and freezing temperatures at night in winter. There has been no rain for ten years. Nevertheless, the people have been

able to organize their daily life. Artesian wells have been drilled. The water tastes salty but is suitable for drinking. Showers have been put up and irrigated farms organized. One such farm I visited looked like a huge emerald set in the dull brown sand. Even trees have grown on the irrigated plots of land.

The organization of economic life in the camps resembles war communism. There is no money system there. The refugees exist thanks to aid provided by international organizations and individual countries. For instance, the foodstuffs supplied as humanitarian aid are evenly distributed between the dairas (administrative subdivisions of the wilayats, with each wilayat consisting of five to six dairas), and each daira evenly distributes the food amongst its smaller subdivisions known as heys.

Each camp has sewing and weaving workshops, hospitals, schools, kindergartens and agricultural plots. The camp town also has a poultry farm which daily produces 75,000 eggs. Of course, this is not enough for a population of 165,000. Eggs and chicken meat go primarily to children and hospital patients. There is a job for everyone in the camps, and wherever possible the refugees are trying to become self-sufficient.



A weapon emplacement on the Moroccan-built wall

Military training is obligatory for schoolboys because all refugees are considered members of the Polisario Front. As for girls who finish school,

they are usually sent to the weaving and sewing workshops and hospitals in each of the four wilayats, as well as to teacher training centres, or to work as

children's nurses in kindergartens.

Male adults take part in the Front's combat operations. On reaching the age of 50 they are appointed militiamen to keep public order in the camps.

When I asked Majid Abdalla, a leading member of Polisario, what ideology the Front advocates, he replied: "Our ideology is nationalism. But ideological issues are now of minor importance to us. Our principal task is to liberate our homeland. For us, nationalism means first of all independence."

Evgeny Bobrov

our own correspondent

ALGIERS-TINDOUF

Western Sahara – a problem of concern to the world community

The future of Western Sahara has repeatedly been discussed in various international organizations, especially the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. The resolutions adopted by these bodies have reaffirmed the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and the need to implement it by means of a referendum.

The question was put before the U.N. General Assembly as far back as the early 1960s, when Western Sahara was still ruled by Spain. In December 1966 the 21st General Assembly passed a resolution, calling on Spain to establish – in keeping with the desire of the indigenous population of Spanish Sahara and in consultation with the governments of Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested party – a procedure for holding a referendum under the aegis of the United Nations, with the aim of granting the indigenous population of the territory the possibility of freely exercising their right to self-determination. The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly up to 1974 reaffirmed this right and

stressed the need for the early adoption of measures for the decolonization of Western Sahara.

In view of the claims laid to Western Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania, the 29th General Assembly decided to refer the question to the International Court of Justice at The Hague which, having thoroughly examined the material presented by the sides, adopted an advisory opinion. The International Court concluded that only some Western Saharan tribes had legal ties with Morocco and Mauritania, which sometimes assumed the character of vassal dependence.

Proceeding from this, the International Court reached the conclusion that neither Morocco nor Mauritania had any territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara and that this made it possible to carry out U.N. Resolution 1514 (XV) on decolonization and to apply the principle of self-determination by means of the free expression of the will of the territory's inhabitants.

The question of Western Sahara has also been re-

peatedly considered by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The 19th session of the OAU Assembly, held in Addis Ababa in June 1983, adopted Resolution 104, which urged the parties to the conflict – Morocco and the Polisario Front – to start direct talks with the aim of achieving a ceasefire and providing the necessary conditions for a peaceful and just referendum in Western Sahara on the question of self-determination, without any administrative or military restrictions, under the aegis of the OAU and the U.N.

All resolutions passed by the General Assembly on the question of Western Sahara since 1983 have contained a reference to the OAU's Resolution 104. On December 4, 1987, the 42nd General Assembly adopted Resolution 42/78 which, in particular, confirms once again that the question of Western Sahara is a question of decolonization to be carried out through the exercise by the Western Saharan people of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence, and that the Western Saharan question

can be settled only by implementing the OAU Resolution 104 (XIX).

This resolution also welcomed the efforts undertaken "by the current Chairman of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU and the U.N. Secretary-General with a view to promoting a just and final settlement of the Western Sahara question." It called on the Chairman of the OAU Assembly and the U.N. Secretary-General to continue their efforts to persuade both parties to the conflict – the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front – to start talks as soon as possible in keeping with Resolution 104 (XIX), General Assembly Resolution 40/50 and the current resolution on the conditions for a ceasefire and the procedure for holding the above-mentioned referendum.

On August 11, 1988, U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar submitted his plan for settling the Western Sahara conflict for consideration by Morocco and the Polisario Front. It provides for a ceasefire and a referendum. Late in August both sides gave conditional approval to the plan. The possibility of a peaceful political settlement of the Western Saharan problem, which has long been destabilizing the situation in North-West Africa, is becoming more real than before.

Boris Bolotin

*Photos from the journal
Middle East (Britain)*

The fury of the elements

After the long and terrible days of violent floods, millions of people were at last able to relax a little: the floodwater began to recede.

Though the water level of the country's 12 main rivers was half a metre higher than the danger mark, a ray of hope had appeared that the marooned victims could be rescued. But receding from the north, water began to flood the southern and eastern areas, which had previously been miraculously spared from the disaster. Altogether, 50 of the republic's 64 administrative districts were affected. More than 28 million people made homeless by the calamity are seeking refuge on roofs, trees and elevated places. The country has never known such a devastating flood. The capital of Bangladesh, Dacca, was engulfed for the first time.

The disaster approached slowly but irresistibly. First, the Burigang River overflowed its banks in the old part of Dacca. Then the ponds and lakes overgrown with water hyacinths were swollen in other parts of the city. The water level on roads and streets gradually rose to waist level. It was only possible to travel on jeeps and lorries. Then boats appeared carrying people with their possession and cattle to elevated places.

No one had expected such a flood. People did not think of moving machine tools in factories, goods in warehouses and bookshelves in libraries to upper floors or to safer places. They would simply be unable to do so in a few hours. Even the up-to-date pharmaceutical factory May and Baker, built by the British with regard for flood statistics over the past 100 years, was submerged. The damage caused to hundreds of other mills and factories, workshops, printing houses, schools and colleges, and cultural institutions is estimated at millions of dollars. And, this is just Dacca and its environs. One can imagine the damage suffered by the entire nation.

Everyone feared that it would rain. The rain soon came down in torrents, and on September 3 the runways at Zia Interna-

tional Airport in Dacca were flooded. A day later rail communication with Silhat was halted. The last thread linking the capital with other cities was broken. Dacca was cut off from the rest of the country and the outside world.

Rescue camps were set up for flood victims. Numerous families from Dacca and neighbouring villages took refuge in the schools and colleges, where lessons had naturally been cancelled, and in the offices of administrative bodies and public organizations. Boiled rice and vegeta-



Almost all Dacca was engulfed...

Photo from the newspaper Dagens Nyheter (Sweden)

bles are being distributed among the homeless, who have no means of subsistence.

One day I decided to visit a journalist who lives in northwest Dacca. After several minutes of driving I had to stop because of the flooding. Ahead of me lay water, as far as the eye could see, and I had to continue my journey by boat, the more so as there were plenty of boatmen all around. I looked sadly at the signboard of the office of the district people's welfare committee and the Blue Lagoon restaurant, submerged by the flood in a single night. Suddenly a modern Bedford

car with a drinking-water tank stopped on the flooded road, and the flood victims with jugs, cans and jars immediately approached it by boat from all sides. Drinking water is now badly needed by the population. Diarrhoea has spread in some places and cases of typhoid fever have been registered because of the lack of clean drinking water.

"We voluntary workers are trying somehow to help the people left without a roof over their heads," an old acquaintance of mine told me. "We are collecting money, buying flour, baking flat cakes and distributing them among the flood victims."

The flood is a very severe trial for Bangladesh. Eight million houses have been destroyed and hundreds of bridges washed away, and the power supply has been cut. Not a few people have perished in the disaster.

President Ershad flies daily by helicopter or sails on a motorboat to the distressed areas. Grain, flour, salt, matches, dry milk and sugar are being delivered from government stocks to the flood victims. But government stocks are not large. A large part of the harvest has been destroyed by the floods. Considerable hopes are pinned on food supplies from abroad.

Though it will take some time to deal with the aftermath of the tragedy, the public is already calling for urgent and effective measures to avert floods. It is particularly necessary to build dykes along river banks and water storages, and to deepen the beds of the main rivers. However, this is not the first time the question has been raised by public opinion. The

local weekly The Dhaka Courier comments in this connection that in the last 50 years calls for urgent measures have remained mere words. If we can "afford" damage estimated at a billion dollars, the weekly says, wouldn't it be better to use at least a tenth of this sum to lower the risk of total destruction to which we expose ourselves annually?

The flood is receding, but terribly slowly, because the rains are continuing.

Gennady Syomin

DACCA

Peter Medgyessy,
Deputy Premier of Hungary

■ A new concept of socialism has not yet developed in our country because it has to develop not from theses formulated as dogmas, but from what experience has shown to be more effective. Hungary is now elaborating a new model of the socialist market economy. It provides for a mixed economy, that is, the existence of private and foreign business parallel with state and cooperative property. Restricting the market paralyzes the economy. Only the market, including the international market with its mechanism of competition, can be a criterion for development.

Wang Rining,
Director of the Soviet and East European Studies Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

■ Our reform, which has now lasted ten years, has made great progress, but it is also encountering many difficulties. The main obstacle consists in Stalinist theoretical models, and the trouble is that it is by no means easy to get rid of them... Now that the reform in our country has entered a decisive phase, it is extremely important to take a new look at the Stalinist models, definitively break with concepts that have been widespread in China for over 50 years and been put into practice for over 30 years. And the sooner and more consistently we break with these ideas, the better.

George Shultz,
Secretary of State of the United States

■ There are many in the United States who get very



I'm not sure they'll very well do without me

Drawing by Vsevolod Arsenyev

alarmed every time there is a meeting between the Chinese and the Soviets. I suppose that goes back to the old triangulation idea, which is not necessarily totally dead. But, nevertheless, I think things are really rather different. And old versions of that idea aren't really applicable any more. And I would say, from our standpoint, if the things that the Chinese have labelled "the three obstacles" all get straightened out satisfactorily, and Afghanistan seems to be well on the way to doing so — there is better discussion about Cambodia and I

guess there hasn't been that much troops movement back from the Chinese border, but it's certainly under discussion, and there's been some. Well, I think that's positive.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos,
President of Angola

■ Security Council Resolution 435 does not raise the question of a phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The intention of Angola and Cuba to take

such a step is a concession designed to facilitate the granting of independence to Namibia.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany


■ Gorbachev wants the reforms to provide greater freedom and independence for everyone. He wants to see more pluralism in Soviet soci-

ety. But he does not want all this to create a system of the Western type. However, even the incipient tendency will, in any case, give greater freedom of action to everyone. It is certainly a revolutionary process. Meanwhile, very many people still find it very difficult to renounce stereotypes, the enemy image... Are the Soviet reforms in our interests? I reply in the affirmative... It is also in our interests not only to respond positively to this process, but to adopt a constructive attitude to it.

Michael Dukakis,
Democratic Party Presidential Candidate, U.S.A.

■ As President, I want to challenge the Soviet Union to move beyond the limits of START, to stop the development of new and more dangerous weapons that threaten world stability and our security; to stop developing fast, new submarine missiles that can attack our bombers before they get off the ground; to eliminate all of their SS-18s, the most dangerous and the most deadly missile on the earth today. And I will challenge the Soviet Union, as has every President since Dwight Eisenhower with one exception, to stop the testing of nuclear weapons.

SWEDEN



The Social Democratic leader, Ingvar Carlsson, will again head the cabinet.

Photo from the newspaper Dagens Nyheter (Sweden)

Status quo plus Greens

The Social Democrats win the general election again

The posters put up throughout Stockholm during the election campaign fluttered in the wind. One of them, issued by the Moderate Party, asked: "When did you see a happy Social Democrat?" But this sarcastic question should now be addressed to the bourgeois opposition. Its strength in the Riksdag has fallen from 171 to 151 seats, and its hopes of forming a cabinet have evaporated. Voters punished the opposition for its desire to bring about "changes in the system," and reaffirmed their intention to preserve an extensive network of social guarantees and benefits.

Ingvar Carlsson, who was fighting his first election as the Social Democratic leader, won public sympathies with his devotion to the "Swedish model," backed up materially by successes in his government's economic policy. Though the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) lost three seats, its partner – the Swedish Left Party (Communists) – increased its representation and, as before, the two parties have a majority in the Riksdag (177 out of 349 seats).

The Greens' breakthrough into parliament did not cause the expected "political earthquake" in the country, and is regarded as a further proof of a shift to the left.

So, the West European Social Democratic bastion has held out. This is very important for the Social Democratic movement, which has recently experienced a crisis even in those countries where it had dominant positions in the past. The Labour Party in Britain, and the Social Democrats in the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark and other countries are looking at Sweden in the hope of acquiring its positive experience and increasing their prestige and popularity. What aspects of the SDLP's policy attracted wide sections of the population?

The Social Democrats' promises in the area of concern for man in the full sense of the word seem to appeal to the public most of all. By 1991, the SDLP says, all children aged more than 18 months will have been provided with places in crèches or kindergartens, and paid maternity leave will have been extended to 18 months. The party is also planning to introduce legislatively an annual six-week leave for all employees. Broad measures are to be taken to extend democracy in the sphere of production and improve working conditions. For instance, a special commission is being set up with the participation of the trade unions to examine the health problems of workers employed in harmful trades.

Environment protection is an important area of the SDLP's activity. Ingvar Carlsson even compares this task in its importance with the historic struggle of the working-class movement for political and economic rights. Besides the intention to avert environmental pollution and toughen legislation on nature conservation, the SDLP is for the first time going to make companies guilty of wrecking the ecological balance pay money to restore it. The appearance of the "Green lobby" in the Riksdag is expected to lead to a more radical government policy in this sphere.

The financing of vast programmes will require considerable expenditure. However, the possibilities of raising taxes in a country that holds a world record in this field have already been exhausted. That is why the Social Democrats are going to revise the tax system. "We shall not increase taxes," said Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt, who has raised 114 taxes

in the last six years. "But we shall make them fairer for groups of the population with different incomes. Moreover, more of the budget will be spent on special-purpose programmes, and control over the use of public funds will be more rigid."

Steering clear of military and political alliances and a vigorous struggle for peace will remain key principles in neutral Sweden's foreign policy. Ingvar Carlsson intends to continue the dialogue with the European Economic Community, but is not raising the question of joining it. Sweden is going to continue develop its relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, and support progressive forces in Third World states. An interesting new element in Sweden's foreign policy is its direct participation in international efforts for control over the implementation of disarmament agreements, particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States. For instance, there is a plan to create "an independent satellite system" under the aegis of the U.N. to carry out space observation of strategic armaments.

Outlining the government's plans at a meeting with journalists, Ingvar Carlsson presented an excellent example of "a happy Social Democrat." Having secured public support, he appears to hope sincerely to make other Swedes happy too.

Alexander Polyukhov,

our own correspondent

STOCKHOLM

The die is cast

Dan Quayle, Republican vice-presidential nominee

"A nice guy," said the American journalist accredited to the U.S. Congress in answer to my request to describe Senator Dan Quayle, the vice-presidential candidate just appointed by George Bush.

The answer sounded surprisingly short.

Then in New Orleans the thousands of journalists gathered from all over the world to give an account of the Republican Convention had more questions to ask about the possible U.S. Vice-President than answers could be offered.

Who is Senator Quayle anyway?

Fortune's favourite

The nomination of Dan Quayle at the convention caused a real sensation which was, perhaps, the only one. Though he figured on the list of likely candidates, no one could seriously consider the young senator from America's backyard, which is what the State of Indiana, part of America's so-called "corn belt," is. He could hardly hold a candle to such experienced politicians as Senator Bob Dole and his wife Elizabeth, who once held important posts in the government, former senator Jack Kemp, or Professor Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

Let us, for a while, set aside the question of what guided the Vice-President when, in hot and sultry New Orleans, he was making the decision as to his likely successor, and how free he was in making his selection, but turn to the biography of his choice.

Indeed, he is fortune's favourite. This is the first thing that strikes one when one gets to know Senator Quayle's biography. Danforth or Dan, as people now call him, has been lucky since birth. He was born in 1947 into a family of one of the major newspaper barons in the Midwest. Today the Quayle family fortune is estimated at approximately a billion dollars.

The wealth of James Quayle, the senator's father, and of Eugene Pulliam, his maternal grandfather, who founded the newspaper and magazine empire the Quayles now own, evolved in proportion to their conservative, if not reactionary, views. It is known that in the 1950s and



The Quayle family on its way up the political Olympus.

Photo from the U.S. News and World Report

the 1960s James Quayle was a member of the notorious John Birch Society and an ardent supporter of the ultra-right-wing senator Barry Goldwater.

His parents fostered their political leanings in their son. When in 1963 Dan entered college in his native town of Huntington, he went round in an automobile boasting the symbols $Au\ H_2O$, the chemical formula for "gold water."

In 1969 he took his university degree. During his studies he did not distinguish himself in any field, barring golf, love for which had been fostered by his father.

In colleges and universities in the United States students join what are known as "fraternities." These "fraternities" have their own rules and regulations observed throughout a graduate's whole life. In student circles undergraduates establish relations with people who can advance their careers and develop a certain manner of behavior and style. By the way, two Republican candidates were members of the same "fraternity," Delta Kappa Epsilon.

When Dan Quayle got his degree, the war in Vietnam, the least popular war in U.S. history, was in full swing. Dan was liable to call-up, but instead of serving in the regular army he was enlisted in the national guard, where recruits serve "in absentia," which gives them the right to be exempted from active service. The details of this "chance event" came to light during the Convention when it turned out that the chief of the national guard in the State of Indiana, Retired Major General Wendell Phillippi, worked at the time as executive secretary of the newspaper News, a publication belonging to the Quayle family.

Having dodged the Vietnamese war, Dan Quayle entered Indiana University School of Law. It was then that he began to hold different posts, first on the state governor's and then on the state attorney's staff.

As early as his university days, Quayle took part in the affairs of the Republican Party, first as a rank-and-file activist during the Richard Nixon election campaign in 1968, when he volunteered as a driver for one of the state campaign leaders.

Quayle began his career as a lawyer, and deputy editor-in-chief of one of his father's newspapers. But it was at that time that politics became his main occupation. Family connections, money, personal charisma and a balanced conservative programme helped him become a congressman when, at 29, he defeated his rival, who had been elected to the post eight times, winning the 54 per cent of the vote.

Work in the House of Representatives proved a continuation of his education. On reelection for a second term, Quayle began to campaign for Senate and won a

seat in 1980 with the same margin as before.

"A hawk" of the new generation

The 33-year-old Senator made questions of defence his speciality. He sits on the Senate Armed Service Committee and has worked on subcommittees on conventional arms and on steps to facilitate the allies' defence, on the munitions industry and technology, and on strategic forces and nuclear defence. Moreover, Quayle has been involved in the work of the labour and civil service committee, as well as in that of the budget committee.

As a senator, Dan Quayle quickly earned the reputation of "a hawk." According to Peter Osterlund, a Christian Science Monitor correspondent in Washington on defence issues, the Republican vice-presidential contender is more conservative than President Reagan. The service record of the young congressman makes it possible to state that he has opposed almost all arms control initiatives, no matter what their source. At the same time he has consistently backed all proposals dealing with the development of new armaments.

Kenneth Adelman, former Director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, says that Quayle was among the senators and members of the administration who encouraged President Reagan to abandon the SALT-2 Treaty, which has not been ratified by U.S. Congress.

According to the Wall Street Journal, Quayle, supporter of SDI, has come into open confrontation with Sam Nunn, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee, and an influential Democratic senator. Nunn sought to keep the administration strictly within the interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which would rule out the deployment of anti-missile systems in space.

Usually one of the congressmen, closest in his views to the administration, as is evidenced by the quarterly Congress review, in 1986 Quayle backed 94 per cent of the Administration's measures, and last year, 89 per cent. The senator led the opposition to the forthcoming INF treaty. Moreover, he bent over backwards to make it less effective, if not to ruin it altogether. For example, as evidenced by Kenneth Adelman, he fought single-handedly for the exclusion of land-based cruise missiles with non-nuclear warheads from the arms elimination list, asserting that this weapon would play a crucial role in the NATO defence system in the century to come.

Possessing enviable energy and perseverance, Quayle continued to attack the administration and the experts until

the NATO Commander in Europe officially confirmed that the retention of this type of missile was unnecessary from a military point of view.

At the same time, Senator Quayle voted in the budget committee to keep military spending within reasonable limits. However, there is no paradox here, as the senator believes it necessary to organize the procedure for the Pentagon's arms purchases to achieve maximum efficiency.

In domestic policy too Quayle is ultra-conservative. Recently he led the Republican effort in the Senate to quash a bill binding employers to notify their workers of impending dismissals two months in advance. This was so skillfully exploited by the Democrats in their convention in Atlanta that President Reagan, who was reportedly going to veto it, had to endorse the bill immediately in the interests of his party's prestige.

Dan Quayle, however, cannot be described as a classic "die-hard" ideology-bent conservative. When necessary, he can find a common language and efficiently cooperate with proponents of other views. In 1982, for example, while preparing the act on partnership in training specialists, he worked with Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy, who is regarded a classic representative of the liberal wing of his party.

An asset or a liability?

Even a brief acquaintance with Senator Dan Quayle's service record enables us to see what forces active in American politics ensured his nomination. It emerged in New Orleans that Quayle enjoys the support of such influential ultra-conservative organizations as the Conservative Caucus, the Coalition for Winning Ticket, the American Security Council and others.

Known among Republicans as a politician of liberal leanings, George Bush perhaps named one of the most right-wing senators in order to win the support of the right of his party, though one should certainly not disregard a whole number of other factors, including personal ones. Against the background of the young and handsome senator making his debut in big American politics, George Bush, grown wise with experience, is seen to better advantage.

But candidates for the vice-presidency are not appointed just for their looks or because they can help ensure the maximum of support the party can offer its favourite. Election campaign procedure in the United States is such that once the vice-presidential candidate is nominated he has to plunge in at the deep

end and any of his mistakes damage the standing of the whole party and in particular the prestige of the presidential candidate.

But hardly a day had passed after Bush made the choice of his running mate public when it came out that in his younger days the militant senator had used family connections to dodge the draft. On the heels of this revelation followed news about his less than modest achievements at university (so modest that had it not been for his family's connections and influence he would never have been allowed to practice law).

In short, instead of thinking about how to use to best advantage the descendant of one of the richest and most influential families in the Midwest to win the vacillating electorate over to his side, Bush had to roll up his sleeves and set about "laundering" his choice. The "laundering" has so far proved effective.

However the sides do not forgive each other for their miscalculations and misjudgements. It became known that in its October issue Playboy magazine intends to publish the reminiscences of a certain Paula Parkinson, a lobbyist in Congress, who promises to share her recollections of the methods she used in her "work" with three young congressmen in a Florida golf-club in 1980. Among those three was – you've guessed it! – Dan Quayle, then still a member of the House of Representatives.

Such statements may well be mere political bluff, like that which alleged that the Democratic leader was until recently being treated by a psychiatrist, but was quickly and convincingly denied by his doctors. Meanwhile, unless the Republicans find a way of hushing up the scandal in the offing on the eve of the elections proper, it may give them a knock-out blow. One need only recall that charges of adultery cost recent primaries' favourite Gary Hart his career. However, who knows...

A congressman at 29, a senator at 33 and a vice-presidential candidate at 41...

Will Quayle manage to keep momentum in his climb up the American Olympus? I am convinced that no one now wishes him luck more sincerely than George Bush. He has chosen his running mate, and wants him to see the race through.

Evgeny Andrianov,
(our own correspondent)

Memories of 1992

Very little time remains till December 31, 1992, when the EEC plans to open "a united European market." However, not everyone in the Community is ready for such an event, including such seemingly secure countries as Italy.

The highest growth rates in the EEC... Firms that only yesterday stood on the brink of bankruptcy report record profits... Shop windows and shop counters are packed with goods... Milan competing for the title of richest city in Europe... "A second renaissance," cry surprised economists, who unexpectedly find that in some economic indices Italy has climbed to fourth place in the capitalist world after the U.S.A., Japan and Federal Germany, and ahead of France and Britain. While the experts are wondering if last year's successes will be repeated this year, a few words of explanation of how such rapid advancement became possible. (In my opinion, the positive and negative aspects of the Italians' experience could provide useful food for thought for us too.)

A combination of several factors served as a powerful boosting force. First, the rapid industrialization of entire regions as a result of the scientific and technical revolution (STR). Then the usual cyclic upsurge, which reached its peak in 1987. Then the statistical legalization and free play of the shadow economy (also known as the underground, underwater, black or atypical). That needs explaining. The shadow economy embraces an extremely wide range of activities: it ranges from second and third jobs, (moonlighting), apart from one's main one, to activities in which the borders of legality are very vague. It includes the activities of the Mafia, which invests capital in legal businesses, capital that has been acquired from trade in narcotics and arms, contraband, robbery and abductions, the sex industry. All categories of enterprises are involved, but the backbone is made up of medium and small ones. They ably evade taxes, drastically cut wages, use unofficial channels for obtaining supplies and marketing their goods, and they not only successfully stand up to the growing

competition, but also play an important role in the Italian economy.

An exaggeration? By no means. Once the government, after much hesitation (to ban and eradicate? keep it as it is? legalize?), decided officially to recognize the "underground," the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) immediately increased by 30 per cent. The efficiency and scale of shadow enterprises (35 per cent of the GDP, and in the fields of hotels and catering, for instance, up to 65 per cent of the total volume of services!) surprised the Commission of the European Communities so greatly that it insisted on Rome increasing its contribution to the EEC budget.

Another catalyst was the rapid change of orientation from external markets (where Italy in many points had lost her competitiveness) to the domestic market, which proved to be a real Klondike for many businessmen. The increased incomes of the population, the slower growth of prices accompanied by the stabilization of the economy, and the reduction of the rate of inflation from 20 to 4 per cent as a result of draconian measures, all encouraged the consumer boom. That in turn spurred on the renovation and modernization of production, the introduction of modern machines and technology, and changes in the infrastructure. The fall in the rate of the dollar as well as prices for imported oil and raw materials served as additional stimuli.

SOS signals

Why then such disquiet among the captains of industry on the eve of December 31, 1992? Why the anxiety in the "Stanza di bottoni" of the Palazzo Chigi (the residence of the government)? Along with their achievements, the Italians are less ready than some of their EEC partners to become part of a "united European market." From the social and economic viewpoint, Italy still resembles a multicoloured patchwork quilt where the 21st century is to be found side by side with pre-capitalist formations. It would take far too long to list all the contrasts and problems that exist. I'll mention just the main ones.

1988 will go down in the history of Italy as the year when the state debt reached the staggering sum of one million billion lire. That is almost 100 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product! In other words, Italy's achievements are threatened by a bomb, the size of which is constantly

growing. The already existing debt is being constantly increased by the annual deficit, and that means higher interest payments in the next year – a chain reaction that increases the deficit as well as the debt. If nothing has changed, then by the beginning of the next century (and that is only a short way away) the debt will be twice as great as the GDP!

Why has the country's economy had no troubles until now? There are several reasons. First, only three per cent of the state debts are owed to foreign creditors (that's next to nothing compared with the U.S.A., Belgium, Denmark, not to mention the Latin American debtors), and that means the economy is less dependent on international effects. Secondly, Italian families are the most frugal in the world – they save about a quarter of their incomes. The government was therefore able to make full use of these colossal reserves by issuing bonds and shares (their share in the material welfare of families has risen from 4 per cent in 1975 to 25 per cent today). Thirdly, the state holds a monopoly in this field. It maintains a strict control on internal finances and the movement of Italian capital abroad. But soon the government will have to give up its monopoly.

As from 1992, it is proposed to lift all restrictions on the movement of capital. Italians will be able to buy foreign securities and choose the most profitable credit and insurance conditions throughout the Community, although they will still not be allowed to open accounts in foreign banks. This is already causing anxiety to competitors in the Apennines. It is enough to say that the biggest Italian credit institution, Banca Commerciale Italiana SpA, is only about half the size of, say, the West German Dresdner Bank. The positions of the insurance companies are no better. While their EEC competitors are buying up many firms and companies, similar attempts by Italians in other Common Market countries have not been equally successful.

They also lag behind in the efficiency of their banks. Modern industries have been built up in Italy but, as the London Economist put it, "its financial services remain medieval." Until recently banks were not allowed to provide loans for more than 18 months to subsidize trade. The opening of new branches, which in any economy plays the role of a cardiovascular system, was severely restricted. There are only 2.3 bank branches per 10 thousand of the population in the country – half as many as in the

U.S.A. or Britain, and a third of the number in the F.R.G. and France. Nor have the banks managed to keep up with the introduction of new technologies. Their efficiency is extremely low, while their staffs are almost double those of banks of the same size in other EEC countries. In 1987 the government lifted some of the restrictions on banks in order to stimulate competitiveness between them and deprive foreign rivals of their advantages. A great deal still remains to be done, and not only in the financial sphere, but in many others as well.

For instance, one reason for the constant balance of payments deficit is the shortage of raw materials and energy – both of which Italy is poor in. 80 per cent of its energy needs are met by imports, which is twice the average for Western Europe. Both so far are being spent wastefully. Since 1970, the U.S.A., Britain and Japan have reduced energy consumption per unit of the GDP by 22-32 per cent, but Italy by only 13 per cent. Nuclear energy accounts for only one per cent of the country's needs (at one time the U.S. transnational companies did their utmost to prevent the development of nuclear power stations in Italy), while in neighbouring France they meet 70 per cent of the requirements.

The competitiveness of many Italian goods is low. The exceptions are the output of certain branches for which special conditions were created (what will remain of such conditions after 1992?), as well as the clothing industry (the latest in techniques, technology and design). But can a country build its real prosperity on such a foundation? Especially when new industrial countries are already breathing down their necks. Science-intensive goods in Italy's exports occupy only half the place they do in France's or Britain's. The reason lies in the fact that only 1.3 per cent of the GDP is spent on research and

development. That is only about half as much as the more developed Western countries spend. Many years of harsh deflationary policy and reglamentation in the field of credits have made the banks very reluctant to lend money for risky projects.

"Cathedrals in the desert"

Regional problems also remain a major obstacle to economic development. Four of the 25 richest regions in Europe are in Italy, but so are 7 of the poorest. The average wage in the south is less than 60 per cent of incomes in the north and centre. Unemployment in the south stands at almost 20 per cent (as against 8 per cent in the north and centre). In order to provide jobs the government in the seventies decided to build up a mighty industry in the south – metallurgical and chemical. This helped reduce the discrepancy for a time. But it soon became apparent that the government had miscalculated; with the development of the scientific and technological revolution the demand for the output of these industries dropped sharply worldwide, and the giant factories that had not realized their economic expectations remained "cathedrals in the desert," monuments to a shortsighted strategy. Then the STR produced another surprise: companies in the north introducing capital-intensive technologies and making wide use of robots and automation were no longer interested in the south's surplus labour. The traditional flow of this labour to the north was turned back, which only aggravated the social and economic difficulties.

The government so far has no clear idea of where to find the money to resolve these numerous and long-standing problems. Several options are being examined. Cutting back on allocations for social needs? Increasing taxes? Fiscal revenue amounted to 39 per cent of the GDP, while the average for the EEC is 46 per cent. But tax increases would only lead to still greater tax evasions (and Italians are past-masters in this field). De Mita's government chose the traditional approach – raising the prices of certain goods and

services, i.e., indirect taxation.

At the same time, the sale of state enterprises into private hands is continuing, though not very fast. Unlike in the fifties, the transfer of enterprises to the state has not made them more profitable. On the contrary, the state sector has brought into being open and hidden forms of parasitism and squandering of money – an excessive bureaucracy, a clumsy system of social security and welfare, an uncontrolled policy of allocations as a result of pressure from various groups, sharp divergences in the forms and amounts of payment for labour (wage jungles), etc.

All this was deliberately cultivated. The bureaucratic chaos and methods of sponsorship, that connected ever newer sections with funding from the budget, were something that the ruling parties not only depended on, but had made their breeding ground. The linking of the upper political echelons with the state sector over a period of decades produced a symbiosis known in Italy as the "party economy." That is why the selling off of the state sector to private enterprise is coming up against resistance from politicians, who do not wish to lose the channels through which the power of the Christian Democrats, Socialists and other members of the ruling coalition is spread to grassroots, returning to them in the form of votes at elections.

As has happened many times in the past, attempts have been made to bring the trade unions to their knees and make the working man pay for modernization. In this, a substantial amount of experience has been accumulated. By actively introducing robots and automation, and following the Japanese model, having off from the main plant entire production cycles and sections (which are turned over on a cooperative basis to contractors and subcontractors, and from them to out-workers among whom the influence of worker organizations is very small) the patronate has been able to get major concessions from the leading trade union centres. But their success has been shortlived. A third force has emerged at grassroots – the base trade union committee (COBAS) – in addition to the confederation and autonomous syndicates. Now the country is constantly in the throes of spontaneous strikes.

Such is the situation. For a long time the Italian ruling class was lulled by its economic successes and felt that everything would be all right. 1992 (whenever it came) would concentrate its mind wonderfully, as the masters of the field would no longer be able to conceal their weaknesses, mistakes and miscalculations behind protective barriers.

Lev Makarevich



It doesn't seem to fit...
From Nuova Rassegna Sindacale (Italy)

"We have 'unpeasanted' the country..."

We have known since our school days Lomonosov's words to the effect that Russia would depend on Siberia for growing might.

Frequent use has made the phrase an axiom. We take it for granted that out that way, beyond the Urals, there are boundless expanses, "inexhaustible" treasure troves of minerals, great construction projects, timber, gold and oil.

The very fact of the country's economic centre of gravity shifting eastwards, the size of capital investments in Siberia (Krasnoyarsk Territory alone got 33 billion rubles over the past 12 years), annual Komsomol construction drives, the triumphant ring of the new words like BAM, KATEK, Urengoi, Divnogorsk – all this projected an attractive image of a dynamic land making turbulent progress and made us confident that Siberia and the Far East are our bulwark, that they are adding tremendously, if they have not already added, to our might.

The romantic aura about Siberia and the Far East was further intensified (apart from enthusiastic newspaper and magazine stories) by the visits paid to those parts in past years by the top government officials – thoroughly rehearsed and sometimes costumed shows – stage-managed to a uniform scenario: "How're you doing out here?" "Great! Come again!"

(I can't help indulging in reminiscences now, although they'll tell you nothing new. Exactly a decade ago, in 1978, an assignment took me to the Far East where I witnessed a historic – the adjective used then – visit by the country's leader to the Far East. In Komsomolsk-on-Amur, right on the railway station, a Nanai ensemble performed a national bear-dance for the visitor which was supposed to give him an idea of life in the city caught in the vice of ecological and social problems.)

The recent visit paid by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to the east of the country largely rectified our notions of what is going on in Siberia and the Far East. Now we are getting a better idea of life in those regions, with all the setbacks – unfortunately not only of local but of strategic significance too – correctly proportioned to the brighter side of the picture.

These shortcomings are well exemplified by the selfsame Krasnoyarsk Territory which has had more than its share of megalomania, Siberia-style. Electric stations on the Yenisei, once believed to be the cornerstones of a transformed Siberia, cropped up one after another. However, the presence of the power engineering colossi nearby jeopardized ecological balance. New hydroelectric projects (which had the blessing, again, of the Siberian branch of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences) will spell ruin to an area running into millions of hectares. Our scholars overlooked another alarming trend which is now typical for Siberia and the Far East – the social infrastructures lag far behind production facilities, and the gap is widening. What we have

here today is neglect of the environment coupled with neglect of people's needs – for which claimants to possessing ultimate scientific rationale must be held responsible.

Lop-sided development of Siberia and the Far East is glaringly manifested in the food situation which, incidentally, is acute not only in these areas. What makes this situation in Krasnoyarsk Territory unpardonable is that its arable per capita of population is 50 per cent more than the country's average. Siberian climate is often blamed. But we must not forget that there was a time when the flow of grain from Siberia to Russia's central regions had even to be restricted. This is a fact of our history.

What is the reason for the region's lag?

Mikhail Gorbachev's talks with the people of Krasnoyarsk revealed many of the causes. These talks once again have shown that in many cases we are ourselves to blame, that we ourselves have put the farmer in a position of seasonal worker. The farmer is urged to produce more, but he has been alienated from land with the result that he no longer feels obliged to manage it thriftily.

Procrastination with the radical restructuring of economic relationships in the countryside was qualified as a major political mistake. The words "we have 'unpeasanted' the country", that were uttered, are both the Party's self-critical admittance of mistakes and a programme of action. The way to revive the peasant's thrifty attitude to land lies through land-renting system and team contract, with emphasis on family farms.

In what way has the General Secretary's tour of Krasnoyarsk Territory affected all of us and what have we learned from it? Why has it evoked such interest both in this country and abroad? First, the accent was made on **problems**. Moreover, there was even a **quest** for them. This is a far cry from the comparatively distant and the recent past when problems were meticulously glossed over during tours of this kind. Second, the issues discussed are of tremendous significance for the country as a whole and the fate of perestroika.

The frank and open discussions in which ordinary people took part, have made it possible to focus attention on the region's priorities. It must be said, however, that a leaking roof, poor water supply and transport problems in the city of Krasnoyarsk were not regarded as trifles. Another welcoming development is that the workers of the Khimvolokno amalgamation did not speak of their achievements, as had been the case, but described the mechanism, employed by the relevant department which hinders the updating of their factory.

I don't think we need these reports of achievements at all, and the exit of this brainchild of our bureaucracy would be applauded by everyone.

Yuri
Shevchenko



**Krasnoyarsk
discussions:
a contribution
to perestroika**

All want change

An entirely new socio-political situation has developed in Soviet Estonia in the course of perestroika. Our correspondent Yekaterina Kozhukhova talks to INDREK TOOME, Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party

Popular Front and others...

New Times. We often hear today that perestroika is a social revolution. How applicable is this formula to what is taking place in Estonia? What are the distinctive features of the present political climate in the republic?

Indrek Toome. The policy of perestroika, as you know, originated at the top. But it released a large and powerful driving force – initiative from below. In our republic, this process was swift. In Estonia people are saying: in 1985 we learned to think boldly, in 1986 – to speak boldly, and in 1987-88 came the time for bold action. The first and very significant victory of perestroika is that the voice of the people has got much stronger. That shows that the ideas of perestroika have found both a response and understanding in our republic.

The press was one of the leaders of perestroika. Next came the Cultural Council – a public organization uniting members of all the creative unions. Its investigations and conclusions influenced the adoption of important economic decisions. And many of the points made in the letter sent by the participants in the joint plenum of the boards of the creative unions to the Party leadership and government of Estonia formed the basis for the platform with which the republic's Communist Party delegation went to the 19th Party conference. In the spring of this year, during the "three weeks of stagnation," the TV programme "Let's think again" acted as organizer of the Popular Front in support of perestroika. And in June at the meeting marking the opening of the 19th Party conference, Popular Front activists assembled 150,000 people out of a total Estonian population of one-and-a-half million.

The issues on which the Cultural Council, Popular Front, Green Movement and many other unofficial groups in Estonia are concentrating their attention are questions of national policy, relations between different nationalities, environmental protection and restrictions on excessive immigration. Speaking of the trends as a whole, it must be admitted that the intellectual forces in Estonia have put forward ideas so revolutionary that they have alarmed, and continue to alarm many people. But I am convinced that the time has come for radical changes, not half-measures. And if there is anything that should alarm Communists today it is the perceptible disparity between the revolutionary ideas put forward by the Party, and the evolutionary approach to their implementation. This disparity leads to a rift between words and action (and sometimes between words), to greater opposition from the different social forces. Because even at the first stage of perestroika everyone interpreted the concept of "changes are imperative" in his own way: supporters of stagnation had their interpretation, progressive politicians theirs. Everyone wanted some sort of change! But now, when from "recognition of the need" we are moving to concrete action, this contradiction between aims and methods is becoming deeper and more acute.

Today it is clear that perestroika, like any social revolution, has to resolve the question of power. The redistribution of power. And as you know from history, there has never been a case when people approached those in power and asked them to relinquish it, and the holders of power gave it up without a word. Power always had to be won. Let's call a spade a spade.


N.T. But it is not merely a question of replacing certain officials with new ones, albeit more progressive?

I.T. It is a matter of creating genuine democracy. So if today we want to get anywhere, our first job must be to decentralize power: in politics, in the economy and in culture, so as to give society the opportunity to create freely. Perestroika must restore to all citizens, public organizations and enterprises the right to **initiative**. Restore the democratic popular essence of the power of the Soviets – that was how the matter was expressed at the 19th Party conference.

The price of conformism

N.T. For many long years the thesis "the people and the Party are one" was never doubted. It was beyond criticism. But when perestroika began and the people awakened, it turned out that this was far from being axiomatic, but was rather a theorem that required proving. Isn't that borne out too by the events of recent months in Estonia? What I have in mind in particular is the period of preparations for the 19th Party conference. On the one hand – as you have noted – the unofficial associations made a significant intellectual contribution to preparing the platform of the Estonian Communist Party's delegation. On the other hand, among delegates to the conference there were people in whom the public had expressed no confidence. I should like to hear your views on this.

I.T. The elections in our republic were held in the same way as in most cities and republics. Work collectives and the creative unions nominated 600 candidates, and from this number, plenums of district and town Party committees recom-



mended 80. Then the Bureau of the CC CPE chose 32. It's true that it had been suggested that all 80 candidates be discussed. But the plenum rejected this by a majority vote (80 per cent) and voted for a list of 32 candidates.

N.T. In other words, 80 per cent of those participating in the Party plenum voted against the views of the public. But, as it turned out, the grievances voiced by the unofficial associations proved well-founded.

I.T. I must say that the investigations and proposals drawn up by the informal associations contained no new questions of principle which the CC CPE was not aware of. Everyone was talking about these problems. However, they had not been stated so radically and boldly. It was thought that it was too early, that the time had not yet come to bring them up, as they were too serious and problematic... And so they were posed by the intellectuals, the public. For this wait-and-see policy, for its conformism, the CC CPE and the government of the republic were justly criticized by the public.

N.T. Let's be more concrete. What are these issues?

I.T. This concerns a whole series of problems connected with the work of the central departments and orientated to the extensive and pollution-risky development of the Estonian economy, which have led to excessive and uncontrolled immigration into the republic. It is also about the fact that many paragraphs and articles of the Constitutions of the Union republics remain inoperative, since both the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers and the central departments time and again adopt decisions that violate the principles of the sovereignty of the republics set out in the Constitution. Also, there is the bureaucratic diktat that strangled the country in the past decades and has had, as it were, a redoubled effect on the Union republics, since the U.S.S.R. ministries and departments pursued their own aims and completely disregarded local economic, socio-cultural and ecological interests. On the territory of Estonia, which had an acute labour and raw materials shortage, industries that required a great deal of labour and materials were developed. Hence the uncontrolled immigration, which in turn could not fail to affect the satisfaction of the socio-cultural requirements of the people and the relations between the different nationalities. As a result of the uncontrolled immigration processes, almost half of the one-and-a-half million strong population of the republic – forty per cent – are non-Estonians (most of the immigrants were invited by industrial enterprises). And in the town they are better supplied (1.5 times better) with comfortable housing than the local residents. That

too speaks of the omnipotence of the departments, doesn't it? If one adds to that that the U.S.S.R. departments were far from being concerned about training skilled cadres, improving production, creating favourable conditions for the adaptation of immigrants – studying the culture, language and traditions of Estonia – then you can easily imagine what a hard knot of problems they bestowed on the republic. According to sociologists, 74 per cent of the immigrants don't care where they live. Often they are people who cannot share the anxiety of the basic population for the fate of their culture, their "small homeland."

Now many of these problems are being solved. A general plan for the national economy of the republic has come into force and it restricts departmental arbitrariness, while extending the rights of local bodies of power. The next step will be to switch the republic to cost-accounting, an idea that was recognized as promising at the 19th Party conference. The Institute of Economics of the Estonian S.S.R. Academy of Sciences has set up a special group to develop the concept of regional cost-accounting. And the general public has been drawn into this work. But it is a very difficult job and can't be done at a gallop. However, we can already submit for discussion the first versions of such a concept.

N.T. You believe that these measures to resolve the problems of the economy will help untie the knot of contradictions between the various nationalities?

I.T. To a great extent, yes. But of course so far there are not enough such measures. The question of relations between nationalities needs profound revision. A special commission on nationality problems, which I head, has been set up under the CC CPE. Its job is to make a profound study of the contradictions that have accumulated in recent years, get rid of false preconceived notions and the complexes based on them, like the common argument that the development of national culture could hinder the development of internationalism. We proceed from the belief that Soviet culture is a matter of integration and that it is only as strong as the national cultures that make it up. But it also has to be recognized that just as the value of the individual was denigrated during the period of stagnation and the cult, so other moral values in society were devalued, and national sentiments were levelled and denigrated. The existence of national traits were permitted only as something exotic.

Today we have to find effective means to treat the disease of lack of national identity. Despite all the complexity of the task, it is clear that the solution of the problem does not lie in the artificial merging of nations, as was claimed at one time

by those who sought to unify culture, nor through assimilation, but through mutual enrichment on the basis of language, cultural exchanges and knowledge of each other's history.

For instance, one of the first priorities – and this was decided by the 11th plenum of the CC CPE – is the introduction of a state language in Estonia (it will be the language of the basic nationality), a statute of citizenship of the E.S.S.R., amendments to the Constitution of the E.S.S.R. and on this basis the adoption of a law on languages. Each person living in Estonia shall have the right to conduct his affairs in the Estonian or in the Russian language. Knowledge of both languages will be regarded as one of the criteria of the professional suitability of a specialist, especially if he has to work with people

Arguments of International Movement

N.T. How should one regard the setting up in July of an International Movement in Estonia? As an ideological counterweight to the Popular Front? As a sign of the diversity of the democratic processes which we are observing today and a warning not to engage in euphoria prematurely? Remember how only a short time ago, a couple of days before the opening of the 19th Party conference, the Estonian public welcomed the Popular Front at a meeting attended by thousands. You were one of those who took part. And now another meeting is hearing and discussing the appeal of the International Movement to all citizens of Estonia in which the Popular Front is warned that unless it hastens to give a rebuff to those who seek to fan national differences in the republic, the International Movement will do so...

I.T. At the meeting of the International Movement on July 19, in the numerous – and so different – speeches the following idea was voiced: "It is not the Russians who are giving no peace to the Estonians, nor the Estonians who are giving no peace to the Russians in Kohtla-Järve, Narva, Maardu, Sillamae... It is the administrative-bureaucratic system that is installing harmful production techniques with complete disregard for the health of the people, no matter what their nationality." But the prevailing theme of supporters of the International Movement was the need to give equal rights to all nationalities living in Estonia. You will agree that sounds very nice. No one rejects that idea (the narrow-minded don't count!). However, the International Movement does not recognize that priority should be given to the development of Estonian culture, the language of the Estonian people on its primordial homeland. That can cause nothing but anger and

hurt. The International Movement is right in those cases when priorities are demanded only for Estonians because of their nationality. That indeed is not humane. But it is equally inhumane and undemocratic to refuse the priority development of, I repeat, the Estonian people and their culture. What would help resolve many difficult problems we have inherited from the times of stagnation and the cult would be wider constitutional rights for territories, real sovereignty for the republics, the development of federalism in the sense in which Lenin understood it (greater rights for local bodies of power in the economic and social spheres, in the development of culture and decentralization of power) – everything that was spoken of at the 19th Party conference and the 11th plenum of the CC CPE. The contradictions between nationalities can be overcome. The very difficult situations that arise at present on these grounds are not a *cul de sac*. There are ways out. But only through democratic solutions of problems, on the basis of the ethical principle of profound mutual respect and mutual understanding between people. No mistake, whether belonging to long past history or made only yesterday, should be allowed to serve as a pretext for national insults – that is something we always have to remember. And if somebody does that or even an entire public movement is guilty of it, under no circumstances should one reply in kind.

“Shepherds” and “flock”

N.T. I should like to go back to what has been said about the Party's authority. To what extent do its bodies today control the socio-political situation in the republic, and to what extent can they influence the orientation of the new democratic structures? How much was said in the past about the “low political awareness of the population,” who are therefore in need of wise shepherds, but it turned out that it was not the “flock” who lacked political awareness, otherwise why is it that so often it is the Party propagandists who can't stand up to their opponents at spontaneous meetings or discussions?

I.T. I quite agree that on the whole in the present day public movement (it has its scum – but that's not we are talking about) there exists a sufficiently high level of understanding and responsibility for the common cause. We have to do a colossal job among Party members in order to restore the Party's vanguard role, in order that it be represented by wise, intelligent people capable of keeping their finger on the pulse of society, all its sections and layers, capable of analyzing the processes at work in it, being the brains behind all these processes, drawing up

the strategy and tactics for their development, in other words, hearing, understanding and putting into practice what the people have become conscious of, as Lenin put it. To carry out in practice, not words, the wishes of the people.

I am confident that the 11th plenum of the CC CPE can be regarded as the beginning of this colossal job. Preparations for it were made very carefully: the times required that answers be given to many extremely important questions for the republic. The ideological situation on the eve of the plenum was acute, and what was needed was a realistic approach, responsibility in assessing public phenomena. The plenum lasted two days, there was a business-like constructive discussion, different views were expressed on the existing situation, and different ways out of it were proposed. There were controversial topics. And people argued – they argued, but all views were listened to and taken into account. The response on the next day indicated that in its significance for the republic the plenum could justly stand comparison with the 19th Party conference. I must admit that the support given to the programme of action proposed by the plenum makes us happy. At the same time we realize that no little effort and time will be required to return, this time by deeds, the lost confidence of the people. One wrong step is enough to lose one's authority. But to win it back is some job. But we have no alternative.

N.T. What, in your opinion, should in future be chosen as the instrument for influencing the public and public processes?

I.T. Only the mechanism of a law-governed state, which rules out the possibility of the abuse of power, the usurpation of power. For what have we had until now? The force of power assumed the right to appoint a Communist to one post or another, even though he was poorly prepared and had no authority with the public, but satisfied superior officials or bodies by his CV. Now, when each one of us is being asked to display not imaginary but real merits, knowledge and ability, we have been compelled to admit the weakness of many Party cadres. They are afraid to go to the people. They are unprepared to talk to them. They are accustomed to getting away with generalizations and the cast-iron formulas of poorly learnt and greatly cut-down Marxism. Yet until recently none of this stood in their way. Such people were automatically given power and the authority of their position. The right to leadership should not automatically follow from Party membership – the failure to abide by this principle has done too much harm to the people and the state. Today this is the question of questions.

N.T. But how does one stand up to this syndrome of mistrust, this back-sliding into administrative command methods in internal Party life and other spheres? At the beginning of this interview you yourself said that history knows of no instance when those in power have given up their prerogatives of their own free will.

I.T. We must move more determinedly and radically towards the setting up of a law-governed state. Concrete measures are needed, many instructions have to be cancelled, and changes and amendments have to be made to the Constitution, to the Party Rules, as was said at the 19th Party conference. The conditions should be removed which make it possible for Party functionaries in the executive apparatus of the Soviets to stand above the electorate.

For a long time we believed that all our troubles stemmed from the fact that we say too little, that all our shortcomings are those of education, that we should talk more, talk better, send good lecturers and Party workers to talk to audiences and then everything will be all right. No. Experience has shown that we have to get down to finding the root causes of our troubles. And when we've found them, see that conditions have to be changed. But conditions can't be changed by explanations and elucidations. Radical measures are needed. The entire electoral system has to be democratized. The strength of Soviet power, that is, people's power, depends on this. What kind of people will head the bodies of power? Will they have the support of the people or will they become mere ritual names on the edifice of socialist democracy? A new socio-political situation will already give the opportunity to operate democratically.

N.T. But how do we go about “changing the conditions”? What should be done first – should we first amend the Constitution and the Party Rules, or make changes in the system of our representative bodies, which will decide the fate of these and other changes? Or do you think it doesn't matter?

I.T. I think it extremely important and opportune. In my opinion, these problems should be solved simultaneously, which is far from being a palliative. For the minds of the people have been awoken and you can't stop them thinking more deeply and broadly. And society, its state and political systems, cannot, must not allow the gulf between ideas and actions, between the revolutionary posing of a question and evolutionary methods, to expand – efforts must be made to eliminate the disparity mentioned at the beginning. But at the same time we must seek to renovate the apparatus of power, to ensure that the problems really are resolved by new people, with new outlooks, new understanding, new criteria. That, in my opinion, is the only way we can advance along the revolutionary course that we call perestroika. ■

The lessons we never learned

Igor Arievidh, Cand. Sc. (Psychology)

One of the main objectives of restructuring in the U.S.S.R. is to arrive at a new economic, ecological, historical, and professional way of thinking. Now, this can only be done once we have thoroughly analyzed the phenomenon of the old way of thinking characteristic of the period of stagnation, and looked into its origins and manifestations. I believe that the basic characteristics of the old way of thinking are feudal. How have they made their way into Soviet society today?

Before tracing their origins, let us consider the specifics of the prerevolutionary situation in Russia, a country that was still semifeudal in all aspects of its economic and public life by the time of the Great October Socialist Revolution in 1917. Capitalism was rapidly gathering momentum, especially in Russian industry, but Russia has never gone really capitalist. It is not even worth considering agriculture in Russia in this context, if we take into ac-

count the fact that until the early twenties most Russian peasants lived in patriarchal communes, which had become extinct in Western Europe by the end of the 13th century.

The October revolution of 1917 directed the socio-economic development of Russia along an entirely different course. All of her revolutions in history had effected a long overdue transition from an outmoded system that slowed down social development to a new and more advanced system. The October revolution disrupted the establishment of a system that was still in the making and did indeed radically change the fate of the nation. Admitting the enormous significance of that change, there is nonetheless no getting away from the fact that capitalism in Russia had failed to perform some of its crucial historical functions. These functions were profoundly analyzed by the classics of Marxism, but it seems to me that we have not yet drawn the appropriate lessons from that analysis. We have grown accustomed to hackneyed clichés about the vices of the capitalist system (which, incidentally, do exist), but we have always felt that it was not worth our while considering what the real function of the capitalist stage of social development was, believing it to be of no importance to us, as we lived in the "next" stage.

But the point is that we did not go through that previous stage to the end. Nor did we inherit from it mechanisms of economic and social self-regulation and progress. This might explain why our problems of long standing are still awaiting solution.

As a psychologist, I take a particular interest in those aspects of capitalism that bear directly on changes in the individual psyche, and the emergence of certain new traits in the public and individual consciousness.

The attitude to work is one of these. Capitalism teaches people to work to the best of their ability, and indeed at the limit of their ability, by extending market relations and universal measures of performance to all spheres of life; by casting off the shroud of mystery from all professions without exception, as Marx put it; by creating a mechanism whereby

one's standard of living depends directly on the results of one's performance; by combining one's interest in the quality of one's performance with tough competition on the labour market and by selecting the best performers. That sort of attitude to work eventually becomes a normal and inalienable characteristic of the public and individual consciousness, as most people discard habits of poor performance. Those of our citizens who have looked beyond the glittering shop windows on their trips abroad have perhaps been greatly, albeit, sadly impressed by the amount of hard work done "out there."

Did we inherit that attitude to work, a crucial socio-psychological prerequisite for the transition to adequate socialism as a more advanced social system? We failed to do so, because that sort of attitude had never emerged in prerevolutionary

Russia. Of course, we have always had great masters of their trades, but not mass education, motivated by economic levers, in working hard to perform well under capitalism, which had existed in Russia for barely fifty years.

Another crucial characteristic is **the attitude towards the individual**. Capitalism does away with privileges that have no economic basis; asserts a parliamentary system of government; advances bourgeois democracy, which advocates pluralism in all spheres of economic and social life, if only in words; encourages individual initiative; and gives the individual consumer the opportunity in his daily life to choose from a wide variety of services that compete for his custom. The net result is that the notion of freedom of the individual becomes ingrained in the public consciousness. Bourgeois society at least cultivates a variety of this known as freedom of choice. All the restrictions of bourgeois freedoms notwithstanding, they mark a historically important step forward compared with the feudal contempt for the individual, and the individual human life.

Enduring bourgeois-democratic traditions failed to emerge in Russia. This country made an almost direct transition from autocratic government, which had impeded the capitalist transformation of the economic and psychological face of the nation, to the dictatorship of the proletariat and war communism, and subsequently to an authoritarian bureaucratic system of regulating the whole of society, a system that has been with us for a very long time. In the circumstances, popular notions of personal liberty, the individual right to independent choice, and the right of the individual to respect for his opinions on the part of state institutions were unlikely to evolve.

Capitalism in Russia therefore failed to perform its crucial educational functions. Russia entered the new socialist era with its mass consciousness lacking in the above traits. A new society does not arise out of a vacuum but grows out of the preceding society and inevitably bears many of the

The administrative system and "birthmarks" of... feudalism

characteristics peculiar to its predecessor. Previous notions of production pattern and political and cultural traditions are carried over almost wholesale to the new set of circumstances. The mass consciousness inherited by the Russian revolution was **prebourgeois** and that largely determined the subsequent course of events.

In the economy, the absence of intrinsic economic incentives was compensated for by noneconomic methods, i.e., the ideologization of the whole of economic life. As a result, a system emerged whereby material wealth is distributed according to status, rather than performance, hence the pre-market noneconomic nature of the privileges enjoyed by some members of society. As a result, the man who occupies a higher rung on the social ladder enjoys greater opportunities than the man who earns more. In other words, livings are not made through work expressed in terms of money, but through status which proves far more important than money. Here is the root of the bureaucratic system of management which has again and again replicated the old prebourgeois ways of thinking by generating the appropriate socio-psychological climate.

The stereotypes of feudal consciousness carried over into the sphere of ideology and social psychology gave rise to a number of telltale phenomena, especially the aura of heroism surrounding the imperative that personal needs be sacrificed to the "common cause," perceived as the overriding national interest, and the interpretation of that act of submission as the supreme virtue and value where the individual is concerned. It is only logical, therefore, that any act of dissent or independent thinking, or indeed any initiative that did not come from above, was often seen as potential opposition to official policy, which was considered infallible because of its official status. The trend towards one-dimensional thinking based on the monopoly held by official opinion became prevalent in all spheres. Pluralism is incompatible with the dogmatic and pseudoreligious mind, and is therefore seen by it as undesirable, hostile, and dangerous. Hence the intolerance of ideological opponents and even of their physical existence, the thirst for rituals of public renunciation of dissent (the political show trials of the 1930s), the faith in the existence of an ultimate truth, and many other things, as, for instance, the unprecedented and truly mystical faith in the printed word, which, having passed through all stages of censorship, simply cannot help but be the bearer of ultimate truth.

That situation was conducive to the emergence of the "obedient man," convinced that there can be no equally correct views on one and the same matter, and shying away from an unusual or merely different opinion as from a heresy.

Primitive interpretations of collectivism revived the attitude that perceived the individual as an expendable cog in the social mechanism, and a means of attaining certain lofty ends of which the individual concerned is not necessarily aware. The awareness of the supreme value of every human being, the true meaning of any social progress as human self-perfection, and the Marxist idea that in a communist society the individual cannot be a means, but is always "an end in itself," were abandoned by ideological doctrines and mass consciousness and remained absent from them for decades.

At the next stage myth-making becomes an important element in the social climate, whereby this or that interpretation

of events at the top, or a legend issued from above about, say, "fulfilment and overfulfilment," becomes more important than the real state of affairs, and is accepted as a basis for behavior in real life, for instance, in the drawing up of still more grandiose plans.

Another characteristic phenomenon is the evolution by virtue of the incomplete new attitude to work of a psychological type, more given to acting in extreme situations than in ordinary daily life, more capable of performing feats, including feats of arduous labour, than of working hard every day, and possessing no inherent motivation always to work to the best of his ability and respect his own work.

At the same time, far from evolving a sense of being master of one's own land, country, and life, the individual mind is alienated from such a perception of itself to the point where it perceives the state as a master to be submitted to, but at the same time a master duty bound to guarantee decent living conditions for the individual. The notion that "what belongs to the state does not belong to me" becomes deeply ingrained.

The above and some other traits of public consciousness that emerged in the country in the late twenties and early thirties were, on the one hand, a product of, and on the other, a nutrient medium for the clear and easy victory of what we now call the command-administrative system. The traits of that system in other socialist countries were the more pronounced the greater the leap they had to take from feudalism into socialism, bypassing the stage of developed capitalism. The best example is China, where the "great leaps forward" and the madness of the "cultural revolution" have now been reappraised. Numerous manifestations of the command-administrative system (hallmarks of feudalism rather than capitalism) are still peculiar to our society today. They range from lethal departmentalism unrestrained by democratic regulatory procedures to restrictions on the freedom of movement; from the most cumbersome table of ranks and titles in the sciences, the arts and even sport determining one's status in other respects, as well to the behavioral features of the Soviet citizen, which make it possible practically always to tell him or her from a foreigner.

Further development is clearly impossible for us unless we dismantle the command-administrative system and deal with its economic, cultural, and psychological consequences. This cannot be done unless we denounce heavy-handed command methods. Capitalist economy in Russia failed to perform its historical functions, so the only way out is to complete our development and create conditions conducive to learning the lessons that we never learned.

Should this be taken to mean that I am calling for a return to "regular" capitalism? No, of course not; that course is no longer acceptable to us. We must find in our own socialist society mechanisms that will act as adequate substitutes for what capitalism failed to deliver economically and psychologically. We will have to pass through that stage in one or other form.

The indications are that in the process of restructuring underway in this country we are beginning to identify these mechanisms and forms, and this is a guarantee that restructuring will succeed and that through the emancipation of human ability and the overcoming of bourgeois individualism we will gradually arrive at a truly humane society.

No alternative to reform and democratization

Wladyslaw Klaczynski
Polish journalist

A wave of strikes swept the country. The author examines its reasons and repercussions.

The strikes in Szczecin, Gdansk, Silesia and the threat of industrial action in other regions were broadly covered, albeit from different angles, by the media in both East and West. Although only a part of the work force downed tools, the belligerence of the strikers and the "occupational" form of industrial action they chose caused whole enterprises to grind to a halt.

What were the causes of the strikes, and are they comparable, as some Western observers say, with the strikes in Poland in August 1980? The answer to that is definitely no.

The strikes of the early 1980s assumed a massive scale. Whatever their subsequent course and the points open to doubt they signified a justified protest of the workers against the policies of the leadership of the day, stagnation, inertia and the unwillingness of the authorities to go ahead with radical reforms. It was a protest against the cumbersome administrative mechanism. The political and economic leadership of the day could not and would not understand anything about the situation that had emerged.

Unlike the strikes of 1980, the strikes that took place this summer proceeded against the backdrop of economic reform at a time when important measures were being taken to democratize the country.

The 1988 strikes were largely a protest against the slow pace, formality and incompetence in implementing reform, if one leaves aside the demands for the revival of Solidarnosc (Solidarity) which, although it was the strikers' rallying cry, was not in fact their principal demand. The strikes were a protest against declining living standards, problems in providing the population with goods and ser-

vices, runaway inflation, and unfair decisions by the government which hit certain categories of workers, among them miners.

The opposition skilfully took advantage of this situation and its members fuelled the industrial action, but history did not repeat itself.

In 1980, the leadership and the party were on the defensive from the outset. They were disorganized and defenceless.

In 1988 the situation, however complex, did not get out of control and the strikes did not assume a massive scale.

A great deal has changed in the party over the past eight years. The party's long-term programme and strategy are no longer a focus of discontent in the country. It must be said, though, that the Polish United Workers' Party is not always capable of taking resolute political action or take charge of events at enterprises, but it should be borne in mind that party members are experiencing the same problems as everyone else in Poland and succumbing to the same feelings of depression and even pessimism. There can be no doubt, however, as General Jaruzelski told the 8th Plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee, that this time there were no renegades in the party rank and file.

The trade unions have also changed. The strikes of the early 1980s literally wiped out the organization that formally bore the name of trade unions. Today the seven million trade-union members are holding their ground, and although they do criticize the government sharply, they never deviate from their class revolutionary stand or assume negative attitudes.

The situations in August 1980 and August 1988 were totally different from each other.

A long and winding road

What has happened? Why is the reform treading water? What are the causes of discontent and conflict?

The 8th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the PUWP attempted to answer these questions.

The basic rationale of the second stage of the reform is unquestionably correct and no sane person in Poland or outside it would question this. But it is a long and winding road from the right kind of rationale to the actual implementation of reform.

There were, of course, objective difficulties facing the country. The most important of these is the external debt, which has run to 40 billion dollars. Interest payment alone drains substantial funds every year.

The restrictions introduced by the West after 1981, especially those concerning new credits, are still in force, but that was not the prime cause of the crisis. There were subjective reasons. Bureaucracy, various lobbies and pressure groups generated empty discussions that impeded reform. Paradoxically the policy of democratization strengthened the hand of entrenched bureaucrats. Many audacious ideas never got off the ground and were bogged down in debates and the deliberations of various commissions.

The government failed to curb inflation, which is expected to run at 60 per cent this year, a figure disputed by the trades unions, who give their own more alarming estimate. There are few goods on the market.

The reform of prices and incomes introduced in the spring failed to resolve any problems, on the contrary, exacerbating them.

In the circumstances the trade unions demanded that the government resign. The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the PUWP decided to bring the issue of the government's responsibility before the Sejm and suggested that final decisions be made, taking all arguments into account.

What next?

The reform has taken a tortuous course.

More headway has been made though where the political reform conducted by the PUWP itself was concerned, but there are very extensive possibilities for further progress here.

That is what the situation is like today. How can the problems facing the country be resolved?

The 8th Plenary Meeting of the PUWP declared in no uncertain terms that there can be no alternative to the economic reforms and democratization of the country, for they are objectively unavoidable. The government has pledged to complete a plan to consolidate the economy for 1989 and 1990 before the end of November, a clear-cut plan readily understood by all sections of the population.

The most important tasks today and in the longer term are to create a healthy market and slow down inflation.

Contrary to certain tendencies, the Central Committee has not supported the proposal to freeze prices on the

The election platform and the problems of the trade union movement are the subject of wide-ranging debate. The PUWP is committed to the "one factory-one union" principle here. It is up to union members to define the tasks of a union within the terms of existing legislation. That stand is on the whole shared by the Polish trade unions.

In the long term the country is facing the task of changing the composition of the Sejm to account for the pluralist character of society. The idea is to form a second house of Parliament, and introduce a presidential system of government.

Generally speaking, it is the goal of the PUWP to generate a broad movement in support of the economic and political reform, relying on existent and emergent legal organizations, including a constructive opposition which recognizes the present system and abides by the law.

The formation of a council of national reconciliation could mark another stage in democratizing the country. Such a council would represent broad sections of the public.

The meeting between the Minister of the Interior Czesław Kiszczak and Lech Walesa should not come as a surprise to any serious observer of the events in Poland. The country's leadership has on many occasions reaffirmed its readiness to enter into talks with anyone on condition that dialogue is conducted in accordance with the Constitution and the law.

What is going to happen next? Aware of the position of the leadership, prepared to accept a compromise, one can assume that the ball is now in Walesa's court and the outcome depends on whether he is able and willing to adopt a constructive approach to national issues.

The Church has set an example of such an approach. Only a handful of clergy have acted in a destructive spirit, supposedly assuming the role of champions of the people's cause. There are thousands of priests who are committed to their religious vocation and do not seek confrontation with the state. This has been demonstrated by the letters from the bishops of Katowice and Szczecin published by the Polish press, as well as the view held by the Roman Catholic Primate of Poland Cardinal Jozef Glemp.

Is everyone in Poland in favour of dialogue and ready for it? This is unlikely.

One-hundred-per-cent unanimity is now a thing of the past.


The PUWP has united around its strategic objectives and is committed to them, but there are differences in the rank and file over the question of tactics. This goes, for instance, for the attitude adopted towards striking workers. Should strikes be allowed to go ahead? Should more discussions be permitted? There are some people who believe that there is nothing wrong with discussions, but that they should be conducted from a position of strength, and these people are making themselves heard.

The leadership could of course have attempted to resolve all problems by force, but the consequences of such a move are very difficult to predict. The moral implications would have been worst of all. The ensuing possible stratification of the working class would have cost the country far more than the losses in coal. It must be clear to all that neither strikes, nor the use of force can resolve Poland's problems in the long term.

The opposition is divided and the majority, whatever public pronouncements they may make, are aware that the present situation serves nobody's interests. There is a clear need for dialogue and reasonable and constructive accord.

There are understandably irreconcilable elements, but they are in a minority and the signs are that they won't be calling the tune in the near or long term.

It must be said that almost every serious incident that has taken place in Poland has been responded to abroad. In the early 1980s the West fomented political tension in Poland. At present the response to the Polish events, especially in Europe, is much calmer. Times have changed. The reforms underway in the U.S.S.R. have aroused optimism and hope. New political thinking is winning more and more followers. Under the circumstances, an unstable Poland could jeopardize the process of easing international tension. The situation, difficult as it is, could deteriorate even further and no serious politician now wants this. Poland is now dealing with its problems on its own, although the understanding and good will shown by the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries have certainly played a part. There can be no doubt at all about the result. The only possible option is a socialist Poland bound by friendly ties to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, an economically strong and internally cohesive Poland drawing on the ideas and experience of Polish Socialist pluralism.



an "occupation strike": the plant is halted though only a few workers downed their tools

Photo from the Europeo (Italy)

grounds that this runs counter to the spirit of the reform. At a meeting that directly followed the Party Plenum, the Council of Ministers supported the move, and the basic provisions for the second stage of the reform were on the whole recognized as correct.

A new approach to the opposition in the specific conditions of Poland emerged. The conclusion was drawn that the opposition could indeed assume a destructive and confrontational character unacceptable to the nation, but that where the opposition is constructive it is useful to both the state and society. This view can be embodied in the increasingly diverse forms of public life in the country.

Preparations have begun for a round-table conference of people from various social strata committed to a variety of views.

Reforms guided by common sense

The P.R.C.'s political restructuring: sources, methods and problems

Evgeny Bazhanov

Far from all party and economic executives have been able to switch to the qualitatively new working conditions. Previously all they had to do was to take orders from above and transmit them to those lower down. Now they have to display professional expertise, competence and flexibility. This does not always come off. Some are simply reluctant to relax the tight administrative reins. The Renmin Ribao admits that in some regions and organizations democratic rights are being infringed on "to the point of attacks and acts of vengeance." The patriarchal ideology and claims to privileges, along with bureaucracy itself, are still there.

Criticism from the right

The reform's critics from the right have tried to identify parasitically with the urge of the national leadership and the people for democratization. Among the voices advocating reform in the late 1970s, calls were also heard to do away with socialism and the Communist Party, and adopt the Western system. It was asserted that the Communist Party of China had discredited itself, that its rule had brought the Chinese nothing but misery and suffering and that Communism was nothing more than a utopian mirage.

"There spread among the population, especially the younger generation," the journal Beizong Daxue Xuebao deplored, "doubts as to the need for the Party's guidance, the relevance of Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Mao Zedong, and the advantages of the socialist system." The newspaper Guangming Ribao observed that some were blindly kowtowing to the capitalist world and showing contempt for their own nation and country. It was indicated in the press that within the context of open politics, some party members had lost their sense of direction, considered socialist ideals obsolescent claptrap, and had succumbed to the

influence of bourgeois ideology, while certain individuals were anxious to restore capitalism.

Alarm was also voiced in the upper echelons of the party. Deng Xiaoping himself stressed time and again the importance of nipping bourgeois liberalization in the bud. The leadership emphasized that the infiltration of corrupting bourgeois ideology "directly imperils socialism, causing a swing away from Marxism and Socialism." It was said that China "is a confused society." Manifestations of the so-called "new fallacious style" in society and within the CPC itself such as black marketeering, bribery, smuggling, fraud, blackmail and the like had become an extremely acute problem. The party leadership accused "a certain section of the party committees, administrative and army bodies and cadres and their children" of such failings. Beijing issued the warning that "the new fallacious style could destroy our whole party." However, the problems that were coming to light did not weaken the CPC Central Committee in its resolve to follow its elected course. One Chinese expert noted that though the medicines used to cure a serious disease might have adverse side effects, this did not mean that the effort to treat the main malady had to be abandoned.

Redisribution of power

Beijing sees the mainstream and key to success as the intensification of radical economic reforms together with political restructuring.

The restructuring of the political system is being effected in a variety of directions. As Zhao Ziyang has put it, the cornerstone is drawing a line of demarcation between the functions of party and government bodies. While this applies to all the socialist countries, in China it has acquired a very special meaning. The period of the revolutionary war brought into being a tradition of conformity in which party bodies were made responsible for literally everything. Thus, at colleges they allocated jobs to new graduates and even said who should be given what mark at exams. At enterprises they had completed control of the production process. Until recently no court could pass sentence without the sayso of the party committee. Time and again the same person would head an office of

which he was also party chief. The CPC duplicated and substituted for other bodies and organizations, completely depriving them of any chance of showing initiative. That served to damage the cause of socialism, encroach upon the population's interests and impair party prestige, inasmuch as people automatically associated the shortcomings and difficulties in life with the Communist Party.

The 13th Party Congress set the objective of getting the party to concentrate on the political guidance of society and "not interfere in everyday affairs." Political guidance is understood as defining the principles underlying the political line and drafting this line, mobilizing the masses implementing this line through its members, translating the party's concept into government action in line with legal procedure, recommending cadres for key posts in the bodies of state power and exercising the functions of control. This reform is to be gradually implemented from the top down, with account taken of the emerging situation and local conditions.

The effort to establish separate functions has already begun. The CPC Central Committee apparatus now has no industrial divisions, and their abolition is gaining a pace in the localities. The reorganization will leave only such divisions as will deal with organizational party work, propaganda, the united front and commissions to check discipline. The range of problems that need to be coordinated with party bodies is being reduced. More specifically, if previously all personnel issues were the responsibility of the party committees, now they will concern themselves only with executives at district and higher levels. Authority and obligations are being redistributed at enterprises. Factory managers are no longer legally subordinate to party committees and in a number of cases are already fully-fledged masters of production. The party committees, meanwhile, are focusing on ideological and political work and encouraging workers to achieve production quotas.

It is no simple matter coping with these problems. The party committees are being restructured by means of a series of transitional reforms. Provisional industrial subdivisions are being set up under these committees: they include, among others, commissions for indus-

and farming. In some places restructuring has yet to begin. Special opinion polls have shown that at over a third of enterprises, managerial and party executives have not been able to evolve a common language and frequently conflict with each other.

The next trend in the political reform is to expand rights at grassroots. Certainly, up to now grassroots organizations "have not enjoyed sufficient rights to decide matters for themselves and have had no room for manoeuvre in getting the masses to be fully active." The objective has been set of releasing the CPC Central Committee from the need to supervise every detail of local administration and to end interference from government offices in the economic performance of enterprises. The overall principle is that "wherever the grassroots find it more convenient to do things themselves, let

Ganbu and openness

Major measures have been taken in recent years to restructure the cadre system. In China ganbu (the Chinese for "cadre") traditionally comprise the special social stratum that figures in official documents along with workers, peasants and the intelligentsia. Last year they comprised some 27 million. They fall into several categories. The moment a given category is promoted, the individual cadre ascends the ladder by one rung. He had a life tenure and was exempt from pensioning off. However, the year 1982 witnessed the establishment of the procedure for cadres pensioning off; also introduced were attestations, examinations and competition for office. On the agenda now is the target of creating a civil service in accordance with which its

working in China. Public opinion polls conveying the popular attitude to the situation in the country and to the reforms are being conducted increasingly often. The authorities welcome grassroots criticism "as is the case all over the world," said the Renmin Ribao, and urge citizens openly to voice views within the framework of the law.

Openness is making headway, though not without some difficulty. The role played by the press is changing. Previously all it had to do, in effect, was to promote the political line of the leadership, as the result of which society's upper echelons were shielded from criticism. Now newspapers feature hard-hitting items and fire criticism at negligent officials. One apposite instance. Linshu district is one of the poorest in Shandong province. For decades it had to be subsidized by the state, for otherwise its



A debate in the street



Contemporaries of the reforms

them do so." The plethora of regulations and ordinances that govern relationships in society all the way up the ladder are to be revised.

Though efforts have now been underway for over ten years to reorganize the government apparatus, the 13th CPC Congress noted that it was still proliferating and that red tape, bureaucracy and procrastination were still to be observed in the work of governmental bodies. Beijing is fully aware that these things can be definitively dealt with only by radically modifying the government's functions. Ministries and departments are to reorganize to what is for the most part indirect administration on a macroeconomic basis. Last spring the number of the State Council ministries and departments was cut from 45 to 41, while the apparatus was reduced by a fifth.

members will be divided into two categories – administrative and professional. Those administrative executives invested with government power are to have a limited term of office and be subject to open supervision by society. Professional executives hold certificates and serve permanently.

Considerable heed is to be paid to promoting public consultations and a direct dialogue with the masses. The Beijing City Hall now has a hot line by means of which the population can address questions to the "city fathers" at virtually any time of day or night. Each Sunday, executives come to the conference hall of the Harbin City Party Committee and People's Government to offer advice and practical assistance to young factory managers. Intensive study is being made of the moods of foreign businessmen

population would have had nothing to eat. Nevertheless, as the central Chinese press reported last February, the district's chiefs had built a mansion for VIP guests and were appropriating local farm produce, diesel fuel and other scarcities, while their pet "hobby" was staging lavish banquets, of course, at state expense in a five-star restaurant featuring Shandong cuisine. In a fit of nerves the restaurant cook overturned the table, groaning under all sorts of delices, at which the district chiefs were about to dine.

At a CPC Central Committee plenum last March, Zhao Ziyang said it was necessary to inform the masses still more extensively of what the party and government were doing. He urged promptly telling the people about the real state of affairs, explaining policies, and winning popular support, which, he emphasized,

was all extremely important to get the machinery of social self-regulation going and to maintain stability and cohesion.

Competition for office

It is said in China today that the people must become the country's fully-fledged masters. The P.R.C.'s basic institution of people's power is the people's congresses, the national and local ones. Until recently they were fairly ineffective. As was noted in the Chinese press, nobody took them seriously, as the basic decisions were taken by the party and government. Now the situation is changing. The recent session at the National People's Congress was keynoted by unusual activity and criticism. Delegates disagreed with the government on a broad range of issues, from inflation to press censorship. Local congresses are also more lively, handing back bills to the government for revision.

Beijing realizes, however, that the electoral system must be reorganized really to enhance the role of congresses in the country's political affairs. Formerly candidates were nominated from above and as there was no competition and indifference on the part of the electorate, they were naturally returned. However, they were not accountable to voters, obeying only those who had nominated them, that is, the party chiefs.

Enacted in December 1986 was a revised and supplemented Law of the P.R.C. on Elections to the National People's Congress and local people's congresses. It indicated that the number of candidates should be at least a third as much as the number of seats. Candidates were to be nominated by party and public organizations, work collectives and, generally, groups of voters numbering ten or more. Nobody was to determine in advance the composition of delegates from the angle of profession, sex, age and the like. Pressure on voters was strictly prohibited.

The commentaries to this law stress that rigid supervision was essential to observe the electoral procedure and that it was extremely important to respect the expression of the popular will. The main thing noted was for the majority of voters to trust the people elected. There were also some reservations as to the special ceilings placed, for instance, on the representation of ethnic minorities in the areas of residence.

Last year the congresses were elected for the first time in line with the modified procedure. In some places a sensational number of candidates were nominated for each seat, for instance 29 in Tianjin, as a result of which preliminary elections had to be held in some of the city's districts. In Beijing, the number of candi-

dates was anywhere from 10 to 50 times more than the number of seats. However, no doubt the light industry institute in Wuxi, Jiangsu province, held the record, with 324 candidates nominated for only two seats.

Most candidates, as many as 90 per cent, were nominated by citizen groups. In one district in Guangzhou only one of the 260 candidates nominated was put up by the party and administrative leadership. What was unexpected was that far from all the candidates nominated from above got through. There were cases where such non-party people as Buddhist monks and even so-called dissidents beat them. In Liaoning province, some 300 former chiefs of district and community governments lost their seats. In 56 Shanghai wards deputies nominated by citizen groups, and not the CPC, now head the bodies of power.

The latest elections to the National People's Congress were held on the basis of the multimandate system, with this conducted differently in different provinces and cities.

Yet it would be wrong to idealize the situation. The inertia of old habits and styles is still excessively great. During elections many local chiefs arbitrarily rejected grassroots candidates by imposing obligatory requirements on them. Thus, in one office superiors announced that only men who were CPC members and with college education could stand. Voters were still herded to the ballot boxes. In some places the old rule of one candidate per seat continued to operate. A major trend in political reform is that of enhancing the socialist legal order. Previously little was done in this respect in China, with many legislative acts imperfect or totally non-existent. However, since the close of the 1970s, law-making has boomed. Still, as was noted at the 13th CPC Congress, there is a need "gradually by reforms to make socialist political democracy the norm and legalize it," as only thus, in the view of the CPC Central Committee, "no repetition of the 'cultural revolution' and lasting tranquility and order in the P.R.C. will be guaranteed."

Currently, such key elements of the new political system as a procedure for submitting complaints against abuse of office, juridical guarantees against their adverse consequences, the status of the press and the right to establish trade unions, hold meetings and demonstrations, etc., are being drafted.

Other signs of the new advances in China's political life are likewise to be observed. Inner party democracy is being

extended. There are plans to elect secretaries of party organization, members of party committees at various levels, as well as members of the CPC Central Committee, according to the multimandate system. The workers' councils that have been organized at more than 500,000 enterprises are putting forward proposals as regards production programmes and reforms, and electing and supervising managerial executives. In many places the campaigns that used to be conducted in honour of various red-letter days are now non-existent. It is said in China today that one should always do a good job, not just honour some date.

Outlines of reforms

Summing up, one can say that in China political reforms are gaining apace. One is of the view that these reforms will progress still further, however "gradually, prudently, evenly and reliably." In the foreseeable future the restructuring of the political system, party documents explain, will be geared "only to restricted aims." The view is current, more specifically in Beijing, that due to the insufficient educational level, the people are so far unwilling directly to elect leaders at higher levels than local government.

The overall outlines of the reforms have been defined. Firstly, they will be implemented exclusively on a socialist basis in line with the four basic constitutional principles of the P.R.C.'s social structure, which are "the firm assertion of the socialist course, the democratic dictatorship of the people, leadership by the Communist Party of China, Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of Mao Zedong." Secondly, as has been repeatedly emphasized in Beijing, the Western political system of dividing authority into legislative, administrative and juridical arms is not suited to China. As was noted by the Guangming Ribao, all the bodies of the P.R.C., the State Council, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, are subordinate to the National People's Congress. Thirdly, the principle of democratic centralism must remain as, according to Deng Xiaoping, it makes for rapid decision making, without interference from other centres of power, and largely obviates repetitive discussions and consultations.

The battle lost without a fight

Frantisek Nesvadba

Fifty years ago, having met in Munich with Hitler and Mussolini, British Premier Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Daladier handed Czechoslovakia to Hitler...

The people of Czechoslovakia paid dearly for Munich and today the experience reminds us that we should safeguard and protect our membership in the socialist community, and the sovereignty and security of Czechoslovakia. The Munich deal exposed those who were prepared to betray their homeland rather than defend it alongside the Soviet Union, and thus open up the way to social progress. The events of 1938 also showed the vanguard role of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which consistently stood up for the interests of the nation. History graphically demonstrates who was Czechoslovakia's true ally and who abandoned its alliance for the sake of their own political interests. On the one side, the Soviet Union supported our republic, while on the other the Western powers betrayed Czechoslovakia to allow Nazi Germany to satisfy its aggressive appetites.

capacious schemes

The 1938 Munich collusion and the subsequent disappearance of Czechoslovakia from the political map of Europe satisfied the large-scale aggressive schemes of German imperialism. On coming to power in January 1933, Hitler worked out a whole expansionist programme. An integral part of this programme

was the Grün plan, whose object was to wipe Czechoslovakia off the map of Europe. All these plans added up to ensure the annexation of foreign territories, the enslavement of peoples and the foundation of the German Reich's domination of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Along with the drafting of aggressive plans, Germany stepped up the process of building the Reich's army as such. By 1938 the Wehrmacht had reached a size that allowed Germany to wage local wars in Central Europe. In this context, the Nazi leaders planned to launch a blitzkrieg against Czechoslovakia not later than early October. However, the Nazis deemed it too risky to become involved in a large-scale European war. They therefore sought to isolate Czechoslovakia from its allies and defeat the republic from within. In achieving this, Hitler was assisted by Henlein's Sudeten German Party, which was to play the role of a "fifth column" within Czechoslovakia.

Since the Wehrmacht's potential to attack Czechoslovakia was in no sense as undeniably favourable as it was a year later when they attacked Poland, certain fears existed among the opposition forces within the Wehrmacht, personified by the land forces Chief of Staff, General Ludwig Beck. It was not that the opposition refused to attack Czechoslovakia — they had no differences with the Fuehrer on this head. They differed only as to the form and time of the aggression. Though Hitler made loud threats that he was prepared to fight Czechoslovakia in any situation, at the same time he did not allow "peaceful" opportunities to wipe out our republic to pass him by capitalizing on the chance provided by the non-interventionist policies of Britain and France.

Treachery

On the eve of the Munich meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, on the one hand, and Daladier and Chamberlain, on the other, the Wehrmacht troops were concentrated near the Czechoslovakian border. The attack was to be supported by Henlein's armed bands from the rear of the Czechoslovakian army. Also ready were the SS and police units responsible for carrying out punitive operations on occupied territory.

By September 1938 the Wehrmacht had over forty divisions in a state of combat readiness, including three tank divisions. Secret mobilization made it possible to double this number. The land forces had more than two million soldiers and officers.

There is no doubt that the Wehrmacht was a real danger for Czechoslovakia. But its position was far from hopeless. The Wehrmacht had a series of organizational deficiencies. The low level of reserve training seriously affected its battle potential. At the same time, the Czechoslovak army was certainly not short of arms, and its training was of a reasonable standard. Though in peace time it numbered only 200 thousand servicemen, from the moment of its formation in 1918 it had had the opportunity (unlike the Wehrmacht) of carrying on regular training of reserves.

The mobilization of reserves of up to 40 years of age announced on September 23, 1938, enabled the republic, in the shortest possible period, to increase the numerical size of the armed forces to one and a half million well-trained fighters. They had at their disposal 3,500 guns,



Henlein's men toppling frontier posts after Munich.

Frantisek Nesvadba, Czechoslovakian military historian, works at the Museum of Military History in Prague.

among them 1,000 anti-tank guns, 900 mortars, 409 tanks, 62,000 machine guns and a vast stock of ammunition. In defence, the army could fall back on the powerful system of fortifications in north-eastern Czechia and northern Moravia.

The patriotism of the vast majority of soldiers and non-commissioned officers exerted a positive effect on the battle capacity of the Czechoslovak army, as well as the sense of responsibility on the part of the high command, which was very significant. President Eduard Beneš, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and General Ludvík Krejčí, the commander of the army in the field, were aware of their constitutional duty to do their utmost to ensure the defence of their country. The responsibility of General Krejčí, though, was confined, as is often the case in bourgeois armies, to the conscientious execution of military plans, while foreign policy considerations played the principal part in the president's responsibility for the security of the state.

Beneš built his concept of the republic's defence on the alliance treaties concluded by Czechoslovakia with France, Minor Entente countries – Yugoslavia and Romania – and the Soviet Union. The alliance's relations with Yugoslavia and Romania in 1938, however, proved an illusion. Though in Yugoslavia there was a public movement in defence of Czechoslovakia, it failed to produce any practical results, while the Romanian government, instead of giving a helping hand to its ally, stated that if assistance was provided by the U.S.S.R., Romania would not allow its territory and airspace to be used for the transfer and airlifting of Soviet troops and planes to Czechoslovakia.

President Beneš's reliance on France's military aid proved a tragedy for the Czechoslovak people. The political treaty on mutual assistance with France was not added to in due course by documents specifying the forms of this assistance. The representatives of the French army interpreted it as a commitment by Czechoslovakia to give aid to France if Germany were to attack it. The reverse version was not considered. The political and military-strategic myopia, equivocation and prevarication on the part of the French ruling quarters led them to betrayal. The French rulers betrayed their Czechoslovak ally.

The stand of Great Britain had considerable importance for the defence of Czechoslovakia in terms of the international political situation. In 1938 Britain's commitment to provide aid to Czechoslovakia stemmed from membership of the League of Nations, and was moreover associated with the Franco-British alliance. But the policy of non-intervention, crowned by the role of British Premier Chamberlain in drafting and

executing the Munich collusion, ruled out British military aid to Czechoslovakia. Shortly after the annexation of Austria, Chamberlain said in this connection that it was impossible to defend Czechoslovakia.

Such statements were usually accompanied by references to Britain's and France's military lag behind Germany, along with "appeasement" rhetoric to the effect that it was inadmissible to repeat the bloodbath of the first world war. But such rationales were a mere smoke screen to conceal their open objection to cooperating with the U.S.S.R. and the attempt to direct Hitler's expansion eastward.

Was a different outcome possible?

It can, of course, be conceded that Great Britain and France really did lag somewhat behind Germany, which was busily arming. But that does not mean that in the autumn of 1938 they did not have sufficient strength. In France alone in 1938 the peace time army consisted of 41 divisions and 16 brigades. Britain late in 1937 had 138 battalions of professional soldiers. Though a part of these troops was deployed in the colonies, a significant proportion also remained in Europe. That Chamberlain and Daladier gave in to pressure from Hitler did not stem from military weakness on the part of Britain and France, but rather from the fact that these governments lacked the political will to join forces with the U.S.S.R. to stop the aggressor and ensure peace and security for all of Europe.

This opportunity did exist. And it was real. Czechoslovakia's concept of collective defence from which Beneš proceeded also included the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1935 on Friendship and Mutual Assistance. The treaty stipulated, however, that the U.S.S.R. would help Czechoslovakia defend against the aggression provided France too gave similar assistance. But the Soviet government made it clear more than once in 1938 that it was prepared to honour its commitment as an ally even if France repudiated its commitments. The only condition for the assistance to be effected was that Czechoslovakia be the side defending itself from attack and that the government ask for such assistance.

This was no idle rhetoric. Soviet assistance could have fundamentally changed the balance of forces between Czechoslovakia and Germany. The U.S.S.R., as of January 1, 1938, had at its disposal 96 infantry divisions. Before mobilization of the Czechoslovak army in September 1938, special Soviet troops were transferred to the western border of the

U.S.S.R. The alert was given to 30 infantry and 10 cavalry divisions, 7 tank, motorized infantry and 12 airforce brigades, and 7 fortified areas. Seven airforce formations consisting of 54 planes were ready to fly to Czechoslovakia.

Soviet assistance to Czechoslovak might have been a decisive factor in the collective defence against Hitler's aggression. This was emphasized by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which called on the masses to defend the republic. During the crisis of September 1938 Klement Gottwald addressed President Beneš, and tried to persuade him to accept the help offered by the U.S.S.R. But the President and the bourgeois government of the country rejected the notion of collective defence, fearing "the socio-revolutionary implications" of cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in the country's defence. Instead, the President and the government bowed to the powers' diktat, which prevented the Czechoslovak army from doing its national duty. The republic's fate was decided. The battle for Czechoslovakia was lost without a fight.

The Munich collusion undermined the republic's defensive capacity and sapped its vital strength. Early in October 1938, Germany seized 28,291 sq. km of Czechoslovak territory with a population of more than 3.8 million. Together with those regions which, as stipulated by the Munich deal, passed into the possession of Poland and Hungary, the republic lost 29 per cent of its territory and 34 per cent of its population. The main lines of communication linking Czechia with Slovakia were broken. The country lost 39.7 per cent of its industrial potential. The heaviest losses were in the coal, chemical and textile industries. In March 1939 the Wehrmacht entered Czechia. The state of Czechoslovakia ceased to exist.

After Munich, Chamberlain and Daladier sought the role of peacekeepers, but the Munich deal failed to prevent war in Europe. The heavy losses the allies suffered during the first years of the war were, among other things, due to the fact that they themselves had written off Czechoslovakia's 40 divisions, while its substantial industrial potential had been ceded to Hitler. Nor did the Munich capitulation save the Czechoslovak people from the horrors of war, for the republic lost more than 360 thousand lives. The nazis wiped Lidice off the face of the earth, and destroyed and ruined dozens of other villages. "The green light" given to the aggressor in Munich proved a tragedy for the Germans too. In short, the Munich deal once again confirmed the truth that an immoral policy, though it can give its creators some temporary advantage, cannot pay off in the long term.

JUNIOR WORLD

accustomed as we are to developments of this kind, I felt I had to take the story with a pinch of salt.

In issue No.36 this weekly reported that the State Committee for Education has announced that at the forthcoming congress of educationalists teachers will be represented by "persons elected as delegates" nearly two years ago.

Here is what happened next. At a TV briefing for Moscow teachers, the chairman of the Committee, Gennady Yagorin, read the relevant part of the Junior World column aloud, and the schoolteachers present supported the stand taken by New Times. By that time letters of protest at the electoral procedure that had been announced had been carried by the teachers' newspaper Uchitelskaya Gazeta, and other signs of discontent among schoolteachers had emerged. The executive board of the State Committee took prompt action. It cancelled its previous decision and announced a fresh election of all delegates.

For years we have repeated lethal phrases like "no mistakes are made here." Mistakes are made by everyone, even by those who do nothing at all. It is the essence of restructuring that there have never been and never can be a policy that is always right, and that there must be a policy that really accounts for the will of many different people, a policy that assures the free expression of that will (glasnost) and the free exercise of that will (democracy).

A single step towards the teachers has prevented a conflict whose effect could have been unpredictable.

The signs are, however, that the system of public education upon which the condition of the junior world of this country depends has another test for glasnost and democracy in store.

The editorial board of Uchitelskaya Gazeta (Teachers' Gazette) have been officially notified that the paper will be closed down as of next year. The weekly Obrazovanie i Nauka (Education and Science) will be published instead. Full details have not yet emerged, but this is probably just as well, because we can consider what that move may lead to.

It must be said above all that teachers and journalists have for a long time demanded a weekly of such a status, published in a large edition and unaccountable to the department of education. It really is a shame that there are no



Times are changing

magazines for teachers in this country, if we do not consider family magazines here, but it must not be forgotten that there is a reaction to every action and a side effect to every medicine.

Uchitelskaya Gazeta increased its circulation almost twofold after Vladimir Matveyev became its new editor-in-chief. Two million people subscribe to it and the teaching community treats its professional paper with great love and affection. The standing of the newspaper is exceptionally high, and whenever an article appears anywhere opposing the paper's editorial policy, its readership rushes to its defence. At times it receives up to 4,000 letters, an unheard-of figure for a publication of its kind. Teachers take pride in the competence and courage of their paper and attach various terms of endearment to it. They are urging it not to give up and to carry on.

Try and imagine Trud or Krasnaya Zvezda renamed. The old names, place names and names of streets are now being restored, but suddenly for no reason other than the latest reshuffling of departments, a newspaper that has been published since 1924 is about to be closed down. Now, are there any guarantees at all that the State Committee for Education will not be again broken up into three departments tomorrow?

The staff of the paper has been put together over many years, and it has taken a great effort to keep the paper going. All this is now going to be thrown overboard, and it has been announced that a new editor-in-chief will be appointed.

The boldest and most daring of educators, U.S.S.R. Deputy Minister of

Education Anatoly Korobeinikov among others, have somehow disappeared from the pedagogical horizon in this country, while all the top officials notorious for their incompetence and intolerance of innovation have been promoted. It looks as if perestroika in public education has been interpreted in a very peculiar way. The officials have regrouped to survive, while all the people dangerous to them have been thrown overboard. Each of these firings and hirings can be explained in different ways. But the overall tendency is obvious. It is widely believed that the editor-in-chief of Uchitelskaya Gazeta is about to lose his post precisely because he has rubbed up the administrative and academic bureaucrats the wrong way. Small wonder that the officials are rejoicing over the prospect of the paper they hate being closed down, or even "swatted," as one academician put it in public. They have been dreaming of such a gift for a long time.

Their joy is going to be short-lived, though. Whatever the new weekly advocates, it will have to side with teachers and innovators and fight pseudoscientists and inept administrators standing in the way of public education because otherwise it won't stand a chance of having subscribers. Times have changed.

It is still unclear, though, why in launching a new publication one that has worked well in the interests of restructuring should be abandoned. Does it have to be done to expand the range of problems covered? But surely Uchitelskaya Gazeta is capable of covering all aspects of public education. It would seem only reasonable to go ahead with the new weekly, because it is needed and at the same time continue to publish Uchitelskaya Gazeta and make it the newspaper of the Educationalists' Union. That would really go a long way towards boosting schoolteachers' morale.

Simon Soloveichik

P.S. For three weeks the evening television programme Periscope has been saying, with apologies to viewers, that even at the State Committee for Education it has been unable to learn anything about the future of Uchitelskaya Gazeta. Why the secrecy? A very simple idea has occurred to me: go to the post office. While this affair is being kept top secret throughout the country, the post office and then the Moscow City press department have been telling people that instead of Uchitelskaya Gazeta subscriptions are already being accepted for the weekly Obrazovanie i Nauka, that it costs 6 rubles 24 kopecks a year, and that anyone who subscribes to Uchitelskaya Gazeta will get Obrazovanie i Nauka for approximately 9 months, and so they have actually been taking subscriptions for it without asking subscribers if they want it!

The ordeals of avant-

A second wave of avant-garde art is rising right before our eyes, as evidenced by the Sotheby's auction held in Moscow recently, by numerous exhibitions featuring names hitherto better known outside than inside this country, heated debates over works which many find it hard to admire

Vladimir Voina

There seems to be little we can add to what we said about the Sotheby's auction in our issue No. 29. But there were mixed reactions to this event. Some people are perplexed, others have their doubts and still others display amazing naivete.

The comments have revealed that our art critics have a vague idea of the situation on the art scene in the stagnation period, and of the people whose works have been put up for auction. Can prophets be honoured in their own country, they wondered. They even don't see much difference between the daubings that Moscow self-taught artists display on the Arbat and in Bitsa and what has been auctioned by Sotheby's. One paper even headlined its story "From Bitsa to Sotheby's?" Such critics don't seem to realize that a comparison of this kind is in itself an insult of painters who have been written about for at least two decades now, whose names are to be found in modern encyclopaedias and art dictionaries abroad. What a nerve, airing one's views about something one hasn't even academic knowledge of!

Take Vladimir Yankilevsky, for instance. His work features at exhibitions at the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the Georges Pompidou Centre of modern art, the National Gallery in Prague and the Museum of Fine Arts in Budapest, the Dresden Gallery and the Ludwig Museum in Cologne, the Bochum Museum in the F.R.G. and other world-famous art collections. It is not to be noted that connoisseurs of art in the U.S.A., the U.D.R. and the U.S.S.R. and Hungary, Fr-

ance and the C.S.S.R.... It is only at home that his works have never found their way into exhibitions or picture galleries. The wary critic wonders why our recognized "celebrities" leave people totally cold "over there" and why only those frowned upon here are popular abroad. Isn't this part of a political conspiracy, its malicious intent being to denigrate us? Some comments on the Sotheby's auction were in the same vein, although less pronouncedly so. We have grudgingly admitted, in the end, that there does exist a world science not confined to any national boundaries, just as there are world sport and world cinema, not to speak of world literature... But, we just couldn't stretch a point in the case of the fine arts.

Our theoreticians doggedly insisted that there is no such thing as world representation art. "Our" criteria differ from "theirs"; "ours" are progressive, and "theirs" are commercial, reactionary and anti-humane. We are the only ones to march in step, the others are marching

out of step. The only reason why they are so willing to buy our formalist, abstractionist and other such off-beat pictures to spite us. Is that true of avant-garde art lovers in Dresden, Prague and Budapest — are they also our "enemies" and "wishers"? You see, we are told, the bourgeois system of government reigns there until fairly recently, so people there haven't arrived at a progressive world outlook yet, and their tastes remain decadent; nevertheless, they are certain to reach our standard in the long run. Or wonders what rich men "over there" are so generous as to pay millions to a Soviet artist just for having renounced the academic style of painting? (There have been allegations to that effect.)

Art and politics often go together, of course, but there are things you can't put your finger on; the work of Picasso and Chagall, Orozco and Siqueiros, Kandinsky and Malevich, Tatline and Rodchenko, Filonov, Dali and many other



Alexander Rodchenko and his work which fetched the highest price at the Sotheby's auction in Moscow

garde artists

ave proved to be of great objective value, a concentrated expression of the artistic genius of our contradictory and magic age, and corroborated the soundness of the criteria that have established themselves worldwide!

Some in this country find it difficult to acknowledge this fact, because this could amount to an admission that sham idols and sham values have been imposed on us for decades. The hollow "greats," who came to believe in their own greatness in earnest, went all out to keep the works of our avant-garde artists away from the public eye. Isn't it time we came out openly against this practice now, after the Sotheby's auction?

And here is another delusion, voiced recently by Komsomolskaya Pravda, which wrote: "On the eve of the auction, they tormented themselves with one and the same question: what if works of special artistic value go under the hammer?" Sovetskaya Kultura was even more explicit on that score. The answer our critics gave to this question was, perhaps, their biggest lie ever. They tried to convince readers that nothing really terrible had happened at the auction; we had just got rid of "second-rate" pictures, nothing to lose sleep about. In general, it was a good thing we sold them, now we could buy something more worthwhile... Somehow the critics failed to mention in this context the tragic pages of our art's history — and it was exactly those pages that compelled me to take up the subject again.

A huge exhibition of Pavel Filonov's works opened in Leningrad some time ago. Few know much about the life of this artist and his work.

He seldom had enough to eat, and was so poor he couldn't even afford a piece of canvas to paint on. He did his oils on paper instead, an unprecedented case. His friends tried to talk him into exhibiting his masterpieces in the West and said most of them were certain to sell there, but he refused on the grounds that he wanted people at home to see them first. He died of emaciation shortly after the Nazis laid siege to Leningrad... In compliance with his deathbed wish, his sisters offered hundreds of his works to the Russian Museum, which would have purchased them, even if only to support

the frail women. But it was forbidden to do so. What's more, without the permission of the Ministry of Culture the Museum could not accept the pictures as a gift; the lists of "eligible" works were submitted to it "from above," and the result was a vicious circle. The point is that on becoming the Museum's property the pictures

lady in charge of the "special depository," was too young when I miraculously found my way to it twenty years ago, and had never laid eyes on them. "I would have given my left arm to see the pictures. There are hundreds of Filonovs here!"

It was only recently that the donation has been "legalized," and now the pictures have been wrested out of captivity,

After Tatline had died, seven of his surviving close friends came over to bid him a last farewell. The world had lost a great artist forgotten by all except those seven... The demise of Rodchenko and



A fragment of a monumental composition by Ada Rybachuk and Vladimirt Melnichenko in Kiev. The work was found offensive by our diehards who had it poured over with concrete

would have been recognized automatically as part of the national art treasury — albeit hidden for the time being. Those who had made life miserable for Filonov and other gifted artists blocked that "loophole." I am not so sure that the ban has been lifted; most works by postwar avant-garde artists who would have readily donated them to museums free of charge, have been auctioned off instead. But no museum accepted these pictures, even as a gift!

However, the Russian Museum workers, who admired Filonov's art, managed to circumvent the ban and find a loophole in the prescribed order of things: they put the pictures down in their books as "property put in for temporary safe-keeping," rolled them up, and hid them well... The pictures remained hidden for years. If unrolled, they had to be stretched over underframes rightaway lest they should crack... The keeper of these treasure, the

other masters also went unnoticed; no museums chased their legacy, no private collectors offered their impoverished widows "small fortunes": what was the use of investing money in commodities that had no market prices and were banned anyway? It was only Georgios Kostaki, the far-sighted Greek and long-time resident of Moscow, a man in love with our country and its culture, who decided to build up a collection of masterpieces by our avant-garde artists of the twenties and their postwar followers. He wasn't very well off and couldn't pay much, but for the elderly owners of the pictures, whatever sums they fetched were a welcome addition to their meagre pensions. Our young contemporaries also sold their work for token prices, realizing that their art is here to stay. They have proved right, and although, most unfortunately, their art is now for others to enjoy, we must pay the collector his due... "Aren't we let-

ting too much wealth slip through our fingers?" one of our art critics commented after the Sotheby's auction. The hypocrisy of it! We have already lost art treasures before and, besides, who had any use for these avant-garde paintings at home? Often, even dire financial straits didn't compel our great artists' next of kin to sell anything. They deserve every praise for that. But would it be wrong of them today if they tried to improve their finances through auctions? Who is this absurd question addressed to? To those who didn't want the pictures even free of charge?

Until the last days of his life, the sculptor Vadim Sidur worked in an unlit basement, often knee-deep in water. The creator of ten or so anti-fascist sculptures now to be seen in the F.R.G. and West Berlin, he was totally unknown at home. Now in the West, Sidur's life-time bibliography was in excess of 330 titles. He gave the Germans the models of the above-mentioned monuments free of charge. After his recent death, hundreds of the works he left were in danger of being thrown out. It was only intervention by well-known scientists and writers that prevented this act of vandalism, but those who planned it were never brought to book. Sidur's masterpieces are nowhere to be seen: after the authorities of a Moscow district asked for permission to set up a Sidur memorial museum, they were given a stern talking-to... Had the Germans opened such a museum, and had Yuliya Sidur given them what nobody wants at home, would that have been a wrong thing to do on her part? And what would our kind-hearted critics have said in that case? Would they have been pained by the loss?

After the West had discovered our Zverev, his works graced new exhibitions in its best museums. The pictures this or that museum took special pride in were often displayed in such a way that the onlooker could see the reverse side of the canvas as well which bore the inscription "Object of no artistic value" stamped on it by Soviet customs officials (which came as a shock to many). This did not prevent our customs, however, charging an exorbitant exit duty, often exceeding many times over, no doubt, the highest price the author himself could bargain for. Avant-garde artists were persecuted by the militia as "parasites"; newspaper satirists and members of the official Moscow Organization of the Artists' Union called them "anti-Soviet agitators" and "hoodlums"; their exhibitions lasted an hour or two, at best, before the law stepped in and closed them or had them bulldozed (I have a couple of bills announcing exhibitions that never took place).

Later it dawned on the authorities that

avant-garde art paid, so an art salon was opened for foreigners (off-limits to Soviet citizens, even to newsmen, as I know to my cost). Buyers paid in dollars, artists were paid in rubles and could now move from basements to attics, which they furnished on their own. Everyone was happy. Did any art critics bemoan the losses then?

I saw with my own eyes icons being loaded into Vienna-bound containers. In Time magazine I read a story about an icon deal. The top layer of an icon was removed, whereupon the icon fetched 30,000 dollars rightaway (as against a mere 30 paid for it in the above-mentioned Moscow salon). That was the initial price, mind you; it is sure to skyrocket as the icon changes hands.

In the twenties, artists like Saryan and Altman, Petrov-Vodkin and Falk, Gudiashvili and Kakabadze, and many others lived in Paris, the Mecca of the world's artists, for three, five or eight years at a stretch. They studied there, and taught others. Their exhibitions were always a success – Soviet Russia and its art attracted enormous interest. In the thirties, the very best of them – Saryan, Kuznetsov, Konchalovsky, Mashkov, Lentulov, Petritsky (the Ukraine), Gudiashvili and Kakabadze (Georgia) even Malevich started falling into decline... Who is going to count these losses, the years and decades during which these artists were ostracized? Proud Falk and brave Tyshler did not give up and

stayed on under a tyranny; Stalin said that Falk would either die of hunger, or go down on his knees. Falk never went down. Others sought a compromise, and no one condemns them for that. Kandinsky and Chagall, Arkhipenko and Soutine, Larionov and Goncharova, Gabo and Pevzner, Zadkine and Jawlenski – to name but a few – refused to eat out of the dictator's hand... They could have disappeared, sunk into oblivion, or shot themselves, as Boichuk did... Behind the "iron curtain" drawn by Stalin over the great nation of artists, the Muses pined. I found only a few drawings by our artists in a G.D.R.-published monograph on the art of the Resistance Movement, a bulky volume containing hundreds of pages and numerous illustrations contributed by anti-fascist artists from all over the world. I found only a few Soviet drawings, the rest of our artists' works on the subject having been rejected by "experts" in the fraternal socialist country as being "of no artistic value." That was a rude awakening.

And what about the loss of those who have left the country – Neizvestny, Tselkov, Rabin, Bakchanian, Cuperman, Roginsky, Odnorolov (I confine the list to those I knew). Their life here was indeed an ordeal. Why have our authors who make such a fuss over "preserving our national wealth" forgotten all about these artists whom we have irretrievably lost? The artists who have put up their works for sale at the Sotheby's auction (there

A happy ending

Life seems a bundle of surprises.

After an absence of many years, the famous film director Miloš Forman unexpectedly came to Moscow for the Peace Forum. While he was here, friends took him to an exhibition of "unofficial" art near Kashirskaya Metro Station. Few were then aware of the existence of these exhibition rooms and he might well have missed Grigory Bruskin's show. However, the Czech visitor, now one of the U.S.A.'s top film directors, saw what was an absolute must on any trip to Moscow, a confirmation that Soviet society was experiencing a revolution. For otherwise how could the public at large have seen the work of an artist who so bitterly ridiculed the decades of Potemkin villages, the fatal discrepancy between what was said and what was done, the by no means futile attempts to convince people that black is white and vice versa. Our entire life with all its imbecility, all its mockery of reason and common sense, all its misnomers which have us to accept one thing in the place of another, its wolves in sheep's clothing and its toads puffed up to cosmic proportions in their craving to be great, the whole panopticon, the whole shadow show, the whole idiotic waltz of petrified dummies was unfolded before us on huge eye-catching canvases. Should we weep or laugh? No, look and reflect. Such was Bruskin's intention, the intention of an as yet unknown creator of a "theatre of the absurd," who was destined to achieve fame.

It is not the "theatre of the absurd" that is absurd, but life itself, the life Bruskin depicts. Brawny, steelworkers with raised heads, ubiquitous public park monuments of oar-holding girls, all-perceptive and all-knowing, bugle-blowing pioneers, stunted ersatz heroes, muscular diskus-throwing ladies, beaming collective farmers, and glorified generals, their chests overspilling with medals. A society familiar to Soviet people from A to Z, a "Fundamental Lexicon" exhausting the encyclopaedia of the absurd. Miloš Forman purchased one of the pictures in the series, and Bruskin became a name to be reckoned with. At the Sotheby's auction in Moscow, only Rodchenko went for a higher price.


It is a happy ending that could have happened only today, in this period of social renascence, when Bruskin's dramatis personae have at last been made to bow out.

ld have been many more of them, our d will never run out of talent) stand a. But what are they to live on in a situ- n where no museum wants their ks (even for free)? Where their works sold off for a song through the salon taken out of the country? All of them t quiet about that, until the prices se pictures fetched on the world mar- gave us a jolt. Is there gold in them e hills?

h Moscow something is happening at st: auctions, exhibitions, "homecom- s" of long-forgotten masters... There hundreds of new names, a wealth of sts and trends. It has taken us sixty rs to bring life back to our art scene. e, there have turned out to be too few cs capable of giving this process quate coverage. And what is the situ- n in other cities? It looks as if the wind perestroika hasn't reached them yet. standards established under Stalin reign supreme there, and the monu- ts - which the viewers of Mikhail m's film "Ordinary Fascism" laugh at tterly as they recognize something fully familiar - are still very much in ence... Formal tastes and practices e been left intact.

hile in Kiev recently, I visited an bition identical to that held 50-odd s ago in order to make Filonov's e mud; workers were actually forced e it for the sole purpose of stigmatiz- and denouncing "alien" decadent art. he Wall of Memory" - an unfinished

work of monumental art vandalized six years ago - was held up to ridicule in the Artists' House, Kiev. The Wall measuring 1,600 sq m offended high-ranking officials, so they had this work, enormous in more senses than one, poured over with



A picture by K. Latyshev, a young Moscow avant-garde artist

concrete... The newspapers Izvestia and Sovetskaya Kultura carried my articles about the fate of this creation by Ada Rybachuk and Vladimir Melnichenko. The article which appeared in Sovetskaya Kultura brought an avalanche of indignant letters from readers. Now how did the Ukrainian Artists' Union respond to it? Here's how: it arranged an "anti-exhibition" with quotations from my article reproduced in huge letters over enlarged photostat copies of documents slinging mud at the "decadent" art of the

two famous sculptors, and some blurred photographs of the unfinished structure, all obviously intended to convey a false, distorted impression of it... And this in a temple of art, the Artists' House! The "show" fell flat, it even proved counter-productive, judging by the entries in the Visitors' Book. At the same time, a real exhibition was held in Moscow's Cinema House, with the two masters' work represented fully and accurately. The accompanying discussion was addressed by dozens of Kiev people from all walks of life who voiced their indignation at this and other acts of vandalism, at the baiting of avant-garde artists by those to whom the names of Picasso and Léger, Siqueiros and Gut-tuso still sound like swear-words. The public demands that the monument be re-

stored!

While rejoicing in the auction and the long-awaited recognition of our modern art, let us not forget about those who are still harassed, arm-twisted and trampled upon by our diehards, as was the case half a century ago. They badly need our support.

We have witnessed the triumph of Rodchenko and our contemporaries, a Filonov exhibition and some audacious canvases by the young in Moscow today. And tomorrow perestroika will certainly spread to other cities, where it is overdue.



Grigory Bruskin interviewed by our correspondent

New Times. Your picture "Fundamental Lexicon" fetched a price of

242,000 pounds sterling. Could you give me the background to the picture?

Grigory Bruskin. It took me years to work it out. At first, as often happens, a kind of an embryo - the prototype of the future idea - emerged and, with

time, developed and took final shape. The picture evolved as follows: it started with a series of my reflections on sculptures (groups and individual figures) of the 1940s and 1950s, which we all know so well, and finally crystallized into the entire system of the "Lexicon." It is an enormous picture, half as big again as the one put up for sale at the Sotheby's auction. It mirrors the mentality of the times.

N.T. Where did you study painting?

G.B. First at the Surikov Art School, Moscow, which taught me to draw. Then I went on to the applied art faculty at the Textile Institute and acquired certain professional skills there which came in useful in my later work. However, I didn't excel in the art of painting as such, and never enjoyed attending painting, drawing and composition classes. In 1968 I graduated from the institute, and was accepted for

membership of the Union of Soviet Artists a year later.

N.T. Was that a piece of luck?

G.B. Yes, I was certainly lucky. I regard the work that qualified me for Union membership as rather crude.

Thanks to perestroika, our country has riveted the outside world's interest in all spheres of our life, art included. Westerners have suddenly discovered a strange art that had previously been unfamiliar to them. Moreover, they are still hard put to classify it. Soviet art critics have also proved unprepared. They cannot find words and notions applicable to this art because it has never been dealt with before. Indeed, our style of painting does not fit into the trends common today. Naturally, contemporary criteria do not apply to it.

This is both good and bad. Bad, because an artist must be a bit "cosmopolitan," if you like; he has to wallow in culture if he is an artist worth his salt, of course. In Stalin's day, we had the "iron curtain." Later, under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the curtain stayed put, even though its material had changed from "iron" to, let's say, "foam rubber." Artists had no way of seeing modern Western art; Western art journals were beyond our reach, and only very few of us could travel abroad. On the brighter side, we breathed this air, smiled in the face of adversity, and sought a fulcrum in the life around us. As a result, our Soviet culture has assumed a special bizarre quality all its own with which it can now supplement world culture.

N.T. Did you have one-man shows before the Sotheby's auction?

G.B. Two – one in Vilnius, the other in Moscow in the period that we now refer to as stagnation. Incidentally, both were closed down. The Vilnius one lasted for quite some time. They closed it shortly before the scheduled closing day. Later I had to explain at the Moscow Artists' Organization what the pictures I had exhibited there were about. They even wanted to expel me from the Union of Artists. That was in 1983. The second exhibition was arranged at the Central Art Workers' Club in 1984, and closed within four hours of opening. Incidentally, I showed there, among other pictures, the "Monuments" that were such a success at Sotheby's.

N.T. Who ordered the closure of the exhibition at the Central Art Workers' Club?

G.B. I'm not sure if it's worth recalling this now, after all, four years, a whole period in our history, have passed since then. I can only tell you that the lady official at the Moscow Soviet's cultural department who had the exhibition closed still has her job, and is still at it, trying to decide for Soviet exhibition-goers what is good for them, and what is not.

N.T. What excuses, if any, are given for the closure of an exhibition?

G.B. Oh, no excuses at all. These people do not meet with artists, as a rule. They just tell them, through go-betweens, which pictures are to be withdrawn from an exhibition, without vouchsafing any explanations.

One can only marvel at the courage of the artists who worked without any hope of their pictures ever being appreciated, accepted as part of our culture, or even bought. In a sense, those conditions were unique: an artist intended his work for an ideal museum of his dreams.

N.T. Does all that mean that despite perestroika artists are still being pushed about?

G.B. Previously, the administrative organizations wielded absolute power, so to say, but not now. Eighteen months ago, they failed in their attempt to withdraw some pictures from an exhibition held in Millionshchikov Street. I showed Part One of my "Fundamental Lexicon" there. Incidentally, it was Part Two that fetched such an unexpectedly large price at Sotheby's.

Well, we were told that the exhibition could be opened on condition that the "Fundamental Lexicon" and Vladimir Yankilevsky's huge triptich, purchased by the Tretyakov Gallery, were withdrawn from it. Later the triptich was shown at the "War and Peace" Exhibition held in the Krymskaya Naberezhnaya Hall. In the centre of the triptich the artist depicted a weird-looking black monster which had probably offended the philistine sensibilities of those who ordered its withdrawal. But the other artists said that if the pictures were withdrawn, they would boycott the exhibition. Vladimir Zakharov, Minister of Culture, intervened, and the exposition was opened in full. It was

then that real perestroika in our painting began, I think.

N.T. Don't you miss your pictures now they're so far away?

G.B. Art lives a life of its own. Each picture must have a history. Russian painting is part of world culture. I have never heard the Dutch complain about the best Rembrandts being in our Hermitage Museum, and the French about the best Matisse being in Moscow's Museum of Fine Arts. As an artist, I think in different categories; in the final analysis, all these paintings remain part of our common culture. Even the pictures that find themselves in private collections eventually "surface" for art lovers to enjoy: they are either contributed to public museums, or shown at good exhibitions by private collectors who are real connoisseurs. For each picture, such exhibitions add up to its life story. All those connected with art are fully aware of that.

N.T. And still a private collection differs from a museum. A collector does not always comply with the public's wishes, and does not always show the pictures the public wants to see.

G.B. There is no denying the fact that a museum is the best place for a picture to be in. But any museum across the world, even the richest ones: by our standards, like the Metropolitan Museum in the United States, are poor. Even at Sotheby's, no museum could afford the pictures put up for sale there. All the pictures went to private collections. Previously, "underground" art was totally neglected. It is only now that we hear talk about the need to open a museum of modern art. I am certain that many artists would consider it a privilege to exhibit their work in such a museum – free or for a token sum. So far, however, neither our state nor our private collectors, buy anything.

N.T. Your own work hasn't yet gained much recognition here, has it?

G.B. In order to find out whether you like this or that school of painting, you've got to "cotton on" to it first. Actually, our exhibition-goers are not to blame for the lack of understanding. We've really gone through hard times – wars, post-war devastation, famine – when people were too busy fighting for survival to care much about painting... It's about time we woke up to the new values that art brings. One must make an effort to wake up. Are you prepared to make it?

Interviewed
TATYANA FIRSOV

What it takes to become an ambassador

and what qualities a Soviet diplomat should possess

Could the old shepherd Khamidula have ever imagined that his grandson would be an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary?" Rashit Khamidulin's colleagues quipped after he had been appointed Soviet ambassador to Kampuchea. There is some truth in every tale, as the saying goes. The old man's name was indeed Khamidula, hence the name of Khamidulin. We don't know for sure if he did any shepherding (peasants are not much given to tracing back family pedigrees), but one thing is certain: it is unlikely to have occurred to Khamidula, an illiterate peasant, that his grandson would ever become an ambassador.

Rashit himself has never been to a village in Tataria, for that matter. He was born and raised in the town of Krasnogorsk near Moscow, and today, after having seen so many far-off lands, he has to visit the land of his ancestors. We first met at the entrance examinations to the Moscow Institute of International Relations. He was one of the few applicants who had only themselves to rely on. Rashit's parents were simple people (his mother, who worked in a factory canteen, was practically illiterate, much more educated than his father, a worker) and he had to shift for himself. He excelled at the examinations, winning the right to study the country and languages of his choice. We studied the Chinese language and history for six years together.

He appeared at school in a spirit of fervent idealism, we entered the institute a year after the leader's death. Our student years were a period of agonizing reappraisal of values, in particular such seemingly unshakable notions as decency, honesty, moral integrity... Rashit, though not belonging by birth to what is known as the intelligentsia proved a far more intelligent than some of our fellow-students from "good" families. He owed first of all to his mother, a person of great integrity of mind and soul, that is to say intelligent, profoundly decent, un-

bending and at the same time infinitely humane.

The Khamidulins and their three sons at that time lived huddled in one room of a shack rigged up before the war in a worker's quarter on the outskirts of Krasnogorsk. Living in overcrowded conditions was common then, but not among our fellow-students. It wouldn't be worth mentioning today, after thirty years, were it not for the tenacity of the traditions of elitism which until recently flourished inside the system our institute belonged to. These traditions can hardly be uprooted at once by decree or a change of administration.

However, he had his own trump cards. He worked as a simultaneous interpreter at Party forums and top-level negotiations. But it is not just his expert knowledge of foreign languages that makes his services so sought after; he is well informed about the politics, history and culture of Indo-China, is personally acquainted with and commands the respect of many leaders and politicians of the countries of the region. At our embassy receptions in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, I saw heads of those states, princes and princesses walking over to shake hands with him to the resentment of higher-ranking diplomats.

He has a remarkable memory and is capable of reconstructing an hours-long conversation almost word for word. His ability to memorize figures and do mental arithmetic used to amaze us in our student years. It stood him in good stead in negotiations.

In short, Rashit was highly competent, his professional expertise often unrivalled. However, his promotion to key positions was usually blocked if considered at all; these positions usually went to the well-connected, even if inferior to Rashit professionally.

Frankly speaking, it occurred to me that Rashit had resigned himself to his fate of remaining forever in the background; even his closest friends never heard him complain. Only on one



occasion did Rashit say to me: "Guess why they passed me over again? Someone at the top couldn't pronounce, let alone memorize my patronymic."

We also used to have a lot of trouble with Rashit's patronymic, but other people's inarticulacy should not be a drag on a career.

"Though not a Russian myself, I don't think it sounds

good in Russian," Rashit often said to friends, subordinates and superiors as well, who, by the way, were not always quick to grasp the irony of the remark and pressed their point — disgracing themselves in the end.

In his judgements Rashit spared neither partners nor colleagues. The latter resented his criticisms. We never hesitated to label him anti-Soviet when he voiced dissatisfaction with our actions. Much of what Khamidulin witnessed in Indo-China didn't fit into the rigid framework, and he reported facts without dressing them up, without unduly praising our diplomatic efforts or his own work. That didn't go unnoticed either; he was accused of failure to live up to the political demands of the moment... a moment that lasted 25 years of his career.

From the affairs of Indo-China in which he was a peerless expert, Rashit turned to disarmament issues. He was with the Soviet negotiating team at the Geneva talks and his work there was also flawless. Then Indo-China again. Many colleagues didn't see the reason why he had moved from prosperous Geneva with its mild climate and hard currency to the restless, ever-turbulent and unstable South-East Asian tropics of his own free will.

Perestroika is the time for him. Perestroika clamped down on "string-pullers" and threw career opportunities open to the most deserving.

We, his friends, have always known he would make it.

Alexander Guber

Off to a good start

From our special correspondents
Vitaly Ignatenko and
Vladimir Ovsyannikov

The Seoul newspaper *Olympian* differs from all the other periodicals of that city in that the date and hour of its last issue are known in advance. The paper will be closed simultaneously with the Olympics, at midnight, October 3. Before the Olympics, the issues are numbered in the reverse order, with a minus sign.

Here is the issue of the *Olympian* which marks a milestone in the history of the Games. It front-pages a photograph of the Soviet girl athlete Irina Shilova of Grodno. Before our magazine is out, many winners will ascend to the dais here in Seoul; there will be dramas and sensations. But I am sure you will agree with me that the playing of our National Anthem in honour of the first Olympic gold medal winner is a memorable event.

Incidentally, the name of Irina Shilova did not appear on the list of our sharpshooters' team published on the eve of the Olympics. As it often happens, the coaches thought she would come into her own later, and kept her in reserve till the eleventh hour. Well, there you are... The debutante showed remarkable willpower and skill. And she has certainly inscribed her name in the Olympic history.

New popular ideas

It would seem that nothing outside of Olympic news could merit first-page prominence in the Seoul press these days. The only exception is the announcement of the decision of Hungary and South Korea to exchange permanent diplomatic missions.

Today another political development dominates the front pages: Mikhail Gorbachev's new peace bids for the Asian Pacific region, set forth in Krasnoyarsk. "We ought to appreciate the fact," the newspaper *Choson Ilbo* writes, "that he has voiced the most realistic proposal for peace in Asia – to ensure security on the Korean Peninsula through economic cooperation. Gorbachev's peace



The Olympic flame arrives at the stadium

scheme for the APR comes in a situation where the outlook for the relations between Korea (South) and the Soviet Union after the Olympics looks bright. As we follow the restructuring of the Soviet Union's Asian policy, we must act accordingly in a way making it possible to remove tensions and the threat of war on the Korean Peninsula."

Says Mr Lee, the manager of a South Korean trading firm: "The proposals made in Krasnoyarsk look most significant to me. I don't know whether it was a chance coincidence, but the proposals were made, symbolically, a day before the opening of the Seoul Olympics. In our country the attitudes towards socialist

states, yours included, differ, but most agree that Gorbachev is now conducting a very good and correct policy... Many here hope for mutually profitable business cooperation with your country."

One might say that besides the Olympic boom South Korea is experiencing two others of equal intensity – the "Chinese boom" and the "Soviet boom." The members of the delegations of the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. have found themselves in the focus of attention not only of the mass media, the business world and politicians. As soon as anyone learns where you are from his face lights up with delighted surprise: "You are Soviet? Really Good!" One feels a sincere friendliness and a tremendous interest in a country about which people here have heard a great deal but as yet know very little.

What explains the interest in socialist countries? The main reason perhaps is that South Korea, which in the past few decades has made notable headway as regards the well-being of the majority of the population, is not at all confident that its "economic miracle" has a solid foundation. Caught between the two pillars of modern capitalism, the United States and Japan, South Korea does not have as much room for manoeuvre and for expansion of its export trade as Japan has had. The economic contradictions between South Korea and its partners are sharpening. With great difficulty it is finding small openings to the European markets. In these circumstances the best way to diversify its economic contacts. South Korea sees in the development of ties with the socialist countries and, consequently, to strengthen the groundwork for further progress. It has much to offer potential partners – computers, cement, textiles. And on its part, it evinces a lively interest in mineral resources, timber and heavy industry output. Some socialist countries, too, are interested in the development of mutually advantageous commercial ties with Seoul.

Your correspondents had a talk with a colleague from the People's Republic of China, Yang Mu, deputy director of the international news department of Xinhua agency. "As you know," he said, "our country maintains close and fraternal relations with the Democratic People's Re-



Street scene in Seoul on the Olympics opening day

public of Korea. Together with the Soviet Union we sided with the D.P.R.K. during the war in Korea. Our volunteers fought there. So our friendship with that country has been sealed in blood. Not long ago the Chairman of the P.R.C., Yang Shangkun, attended the celebration in Pyongyang of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the D.P.R.K. Our agency was represented there by a large group of journalists.

"We have no diplomatic relations with South Korea. We do not officially recognize that country on whose territory U.S. troops are deployed.

"But Olympics is an event of such international significance that our country decided to send a large delegation to Seoul. The Chinese newsmen here alone number 124.

"Although we have no diplomatic contacts with Seoul we see no reason to refrain from non-political advantageous business ties with South Korea. Some Chinese provinces, Shandong for instance, located in close proximity to South Korea, trade with it. Our government does not particularly encourage such contacts, but neither does it impede them. We are for the development of mutually advantageous business ties with all countries, including the U.S.S.R., the U.S., Japan, South Korea, the EEC countries and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe."

Among the People

Choe Chang Guk, second-year student (in the role of criminal investigator): "Did you know that Fyodor Protasov was alive when you married his wife?"

So Hang Wae, first-year student (in the role of Karenin): "We did not know. We were both certain that he had drowned."

An audible gasp rose from the audience. The young people wearing the sport outfits of the U.S.S.R. team were deeply moved once again by the sad story of Fedya Protasov in Tolstoy's play, "The Living Corps," performed for them by the student theatre Among the People.

The performance was given in Russian in the assembly hall of the Koryo University in Seoul. Students majoring in Russian literature had invited the Soviet athletes to the premiere performance of the play. It is hard to say how deep a response Russian classics will evoke among the people, but there was evidence here of a desire to understand and appreciate the achievements of our culture. In the programme folder there was this comment by the Russian language teacher Professor Rudnik: "I am happy to see that the new generation of students takes an interest in the theatre.



The theatre teaches us not only the language, it teaches us to love and understand life." It was encouraging to see that young people appreciated this.

This was the first time "The Living Corps" was staged in Seoul. And when second-year student So Sang U (who played the part of Protasov), killed by his own bullet, fell with the words: "How good, how good..." there were tears in the eyes of those in the hall and on the stage.

Instructions for newcomers and oldtimers

Seoul, the Olympic host, is literally swamped with pamphlets, instructions, memoranda, directions and reminders of all kinds, necessary and unnecessary. There are guides to traffic routes, information about the Olympic programme, wordbooks with handy Korean phrases for foreigners.

Every sports delegation now in Seoul doubtless has its own instructions. The Soviet delegation is no exception in this respect. Our instructions recommend our athletes to be as frank and friendly as they are at home, "not to be dismayed if the language barrier proves to be an insuperable obstacle to communication. A smile, a gift of a Soviet badge or a collection of postcards as a souvenir can tell people who do not speak Russian as much about our country as words."

The American athletes also came here with a memo from their sponsors, listing, for example, appropriate topics of conversation with their hosts: the culture and the picturesque scenery of Korea, everything associated with the Games, and also a few polite inquiries about their children. On the other hand, it is not advisable to ask questions about their wives. Other "taboo" topics are communism, Japan and the internal situation in South Korea.

There are also some curious instructions which evidently are not unusual in these parts. For instance, in my room at the Crown Hotel I found an amusing pamphlet in English and Japanese intended for foreign visitors to Seoul. It reads in part: "The government of the Republic of Korea cordially welcomes you and wishes you a pleasant stay. As you know, we are constantly threatened by hostile forces from beyond the demilitarized zone within only 50 kilometres of the capital. This obliges us to be constantly prepared for sudden air attack. On the 15th of every month we hold regular 35-minute training alerts without advance notification..."

Instructions on how to behave during an alert follow... How out of tune with the



The first medalists: Olympic champion Irina Shilova (right) and third-prize winner Anna Malukhina

Olympic spirit. Or this injunction, for instance, inscribed on the side of the picturesque Naman hill, in the centre of Seoul: "Taking photographs in a northerly direction is strictly forbidden since this could be a strategically important area in the event of the outbreak of hostilities."

The price of victory

However insistently it may be averred that sports and politics are incompatible, the fact remains that 20th-century sports are, paradoxically enough, inseparable from the polarization of social forces, that they are not immune to the storms and winds of history. Recall the militarized physical training of the young generation from early childhood under Hitler. Everything was patterned so as to turn the ancient ideals of the harmony of body and spirit into its very opposite. So it was also in Mussolini's Italy and in militarist Japan. This was how other dictators, all the way to Pinochet, have regarded sports.

Outstanding athletes always personify the finest traits of their generation. How galling are their victories and records to the high-placed pygmies! For instance, the 1936 Olympics in Berlin were intended to be a demonstration of their prowess of the "supermen" reared by fascism. The strategem ended in fiasco. That was the year of Jesse Owens. The great American athlete set new long jump and race records in Berlin, winning four gold medals – more than the entire German team. The enraged fuhrer left the stadium after the black athlete won his fourth medal.

Sad to say, history has recorded the first "football war," between El Salvador and Honduras. The stadium failed to see eye to eye on something or other.

But you cannot blame sports for that.

Happily, 20th-century sports have on the whole been distinguished not by freak behavior, but by their unprecedented and unparalleled democratic spirit and mass character. Formerly sports were the privilege of individual athletes and teams. Nowadays they belong to the peoples. But when they line up for the start at competitions, do the envoys of the peoples always rejoice only in their own victory or do they exult in the defeat of their rival, neighbour, old adversary or potential enemy? In words, in official statements, everyone stands by the Olympic ideals and vows to "Discard old animosities," but in practice...

Take the Taenon training centre in Seoul where the South Korean team has been preparing for the Games. It looks like a medium-sized fortified area prepared to repulse any attack from land, air, and, in all probability, from the sea as well. True, it is hard to imagine who would think of attacking archers, judoka, wrestlers or boxers.

So what do the athletes in the Taenon centre plan to win at the Olympics? "If we can't beat the athletes of the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and the G.D.R.," they say, "we could prove to be the strongest team in the Far East."

"What about the People's Republic of China?"

"They are also hard to beat, but we might be able to beat Japan."

The Taenon camp was organized two years ago and its inmates make no secret of their motto: "We'll beat Japan!" Enormous prizes (100,000 dollars) and life pensions are promised the winners of Olympic medals. For beating your neighbour and ally even without winning a medal there will be a smaller prize, but a good one.

Will there be a contest of medics?

Nowadays sports are inseparable from the global problems of our time: urbanization, the scientific progress and especially chemical research, and the pollution of the environment. Strictly speaking there is no major social and political problem in modern life that does not find some reflection in sports. In a positive sense, as a rule. But there are exceptions. At a meeting of the IOC medical commission held here in Seoul it was noted that the progress of science and specifically of biology, chemistry and medicine have given rise to an extremely negative problem – the use of drugs by the athletes of many countries.

The commission regretfully observed that today some athletic contests are becoming contests of anonymous drug producers and doctors. And the winning of the highest athletic honours is becoming a matter of expertise in the use of the hypodermic needle.

"To take drugs means trying to – first, deceive your opponent, secondly, yourself and, thirdly, the fans," says Professor Manfred Donike, director of the Institute of Biochemistry of Cologne University.

The word "doping" originally came from Africa. "Dope" is the name of an alcoholic drink once used as a stimulant by African tribes during cult ceremonies. The word was first taken over by the British in the 19th century to describe the use of drugs in equestrian sport.

However, it would be wrong to ascribe to Britain and its former colonies priority in the practice of doping. First mention of this evil is to be found in ancient chronicles. But it was centuries before athletes began to be punished for taking drugs. No one remembers the name of the mar who swam across the English Channel from Calais to Dover in 1865, but the fact he was the first to be "infected" by some artificial preparation has not been forgotten by the medics.

It was only after the last war that the public sounded the alarm about the use of drugs in sports. Of course the problem has grown more acute because athletes risk their lives and sometimes die as a result of using stimulants.

The athletes know the risk they are taking by doping themselves, yet that does not stop them. Why?

Scientists and sports promoters are beginning to believe that this is a social problem. It is



gendered in particular by professionalism and the commercialization of sports. If a person is offered a huge cash prize plus a life pension for winning an Olympic medal, will he not be tempted to resort to forbidden drugs? Of course, there are athletes who will take a chance in the hope that no harm will be done. Especially if he is young and wealthy, if there is nothing to presage danger and he imagines he will always be young and healthy. A group of American athletes were recently asked in an anonymous poll this question: if you knew that the drug you had to take to come on top in the contest was harmful to your health, would you take it? The answers were startling: 70 per cent said they would take the drug. What is to be done? To date the IOC commission has prohibited the use of hundreds of medical preparations as stimulants. Anti-doping control at the present Olympics promises to be very strict, so much so that many coaches and athletes fear they might be unjustly penalized. The banned list includes many medicines we all take for ordinary colds or other such complaints. "What about the athletes' objection to these circumstances they will be unable to take any medicines," Jean-Pierre Coralstein, the head doctor of the French centre of sports medicine, was asked. "They say: 'If a child can take ephedrinum, why can't I?'" As a physician," he replied, "I cannot understand why racing cyclists take ephedrinum when they feel out of breath. After all, there is any amount of other medicines for colds. When you hear athletes complain that they have no possibility to undergo any medical treatment, it reminds me of little Cosette's problem in Victor Hugo's *Misérables*."

At present the experts here in Seoul are coming to the conclusion that control is needed not only during contests, but also in the course of training as well. However, the IOC commission doctors stress, this will be effective only if control is exercised by an international commission under equal conditions for all.

Meanwhile, in these first days of the Games all is quiet on the anti-doping front.

SEOUL

TASS photos

PHILATELY

The world on a postage stamp

I got my first stamp collection together after reading a fascinating book for children, "A Postage Stamp from an Exotic Land," by Mogilevskaya, while at school. It was only here in Prague, however, that I realized how wonderful the world of the postage stamp is.

The motto of the World Exhibition of Postage Stamps Prague-88 was "The postage stamp and stamp collecting - a world of knowledge and peace."

Three hundred thousand people visited the exhibition in ten days, a record number for exhibitions of the kind.



The first world exhibition of postage stamps was also held in Prague in 1962. This was the fourth exhibition, and 125 post offices and 33 post office museums took part. A total of 800 collections from 56 countries were exhibited.

Sixty-one national commissars selected exhibits for competition and display, and the care they showed guaranteed the success of the event, which displayed the rarest specimens.

The Prague National Gallery, the Slovak National Gallery in Bratislava and the Federal Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications organized the exhibition of the art and the postage stamp at the Prazsky Hrad (Prague's Citadel). Connoisseurs were given a chance to compare original works of art with their reproductions on postage stamps.

A hundred and sixteen post offices and 13 post office museums from various countries mounted exhibits at the "U Hybernu" house. The U.N. also had a display of its own, alongside that of the Uni-



versal Postal Union. A new museum of postage stamps was opened during the exhibition.

They staged a show reconstructing the history of the postal service, which drew a huge audience in Prague. Two messengers in 18th-century costume rode on horseback through the streets of the city to deliver souvenir post cards. An antique postal diligence escorted by four mounted guards carried two postmen along the old streets of Prague from the National Technical Museum to the Prazsky Hrad and Maltezske Square, where the city's first post office once stood.

An amateur radiostation set up at the World Postage Stamp Exhibition established shortwave radio contacts with radio hams around the world. The longest distance contact was with an operator on Chatham Island off New Zealand.


Postage stamps are quite expensive nowadays. Some vintage specimens were insured with the Czechoslovak State Insurance Corporation. A collection of U.S. Post Office Stamps, dated between 1847 and 1869, was insured by Rihei Ishikawa of Japan for 20,000,000 U.S. dollars, Christian Sunduman of Finland insured his collection for 1,460,000 U.S. dollars, and the most famous light-blue and orange "Mauritius" stamps were insured for DM 3,000,000.

The international jury awarded 32 gold medals. The Grand Prix instituted by President Gustav Husak went to Albert Fillinguer of France for his collection "French armies between Louis XIV and Carl X." The International Grand Prix instituted by the Czechoslovak Premier Lubomir Strougal went to Zbigniew Mikulski of Switzerland for his collection "The U.S.S.R. 1918-1938; Poland. 1858-1870; and Tsarist Russia." Fred Hefer of the F.R.G. was awarded the National Grand Prix for his collection "Czechoslovakia. 1918-1939."

Sergei Dubov

our special correspondent
PRAGUE-MOSCOW

PROFILE SKETCHES



The constituent conference of the All-Union Society of Invalids which took place in August, elected Hero of the Soviet Union **Alexei Deryugin** as Chairman. He was born in the town of Uglich in 1913. During the Finnish war he was severely wounded and lost both legs. Since then he has walked on artificial limbs...

The society has set itself the aim of setting up cooperatives and other businesses where invalids can work. It will also supply artificial limbs, wheelchairs and other such equipment. The society will seek to draw invalids into public affairs, improve their conditions and provide legal aid.

Says Deryugin: "The construction of the Prosthesis-Orthopedic Recovery Centre on Korovino Highway in Moscow has been dragging on for 17 years. Leningrad and Novokuznetsk have such centres, but not the capital... Even our repeated appeals to the Moscow Soviet to speed up the construction have been of no avail."

And how many times has Alexei Deryugin been to the Moscow Soviet, and district Soviets to ask them to provide small premises for the repair of prostheses! Each time he received either a refusal or empty promises...

"There are four million invalids in the Russian Federation alone," he continued. "Many are in need of prostheses or orthopedic footwear. But the raw materials are not available, and what there is of poor quality..."

A far from easy job awaits the Society.



"Neither capitalism nor communism can provide the answer to the future of Nicaragua. We must lead our people along a road that passes somewhere between the two," maintains 62-year-old Cardinal **Miguel Obando y Bravo**, Archbishop of Managua.

Having graduated from the

Catholic high school in El Salvador, he taught in Guatemala for some years. In 1968 he was made a bishop in Managua. And in 1970 he was appointed archbishop.

The new Archbishop of Managua has abandoned the Church's previous policy of tacit compliance. The break between the Church and the junta became evident after the tragic earthquake of 1972, when Somoza pocketed the millions of dollars given to the devastated country by international organizations, including church organizations.

The growth of sentiments against the dictator in the mid-seventies led to the strengthening of the Sandinist Movement. Although Cardinal Obando y Bravo did not support the programme of the

Sandinist National Liberation Front on a whole series of issues, he was nevertheless its ally. It was he who helped obtain the release from prison of prominent members of the Movement. Catholic priests who joined the Movement were permitted to do so by the Archbishop.

After the victory of the Sandinists, Cardinal Obando y Bravo, who favoured the removal of Somoza rather than serious socio-economic changes, and who did not share the political line of the Sandinists, turned down a proposal for cooperation, but raised no objections to the appointment of other church officials to posts in the government. Differences with the government, however, increased, and in 1983 led to an open confrontation.

It was the Iran-Contras affair and the exposure of the sources that financed the Contras that made the Archbishop

Manager

Vadim Rosenbaum, chairman of the Moscow cooperative Fund is justly proud of the fact that at the Leipzig Trade Fair held at the beginning of September, his cooperative signed five contracts with Western firms worth about six million dollars. The currency will be used to buy the equipment and machines needed by the cooperative.

Fund, which Rosenbaum heads is probably one of the biggest cooperatives in the country today, although its independent life began only in March of this year. Its range of activities is very broad: building work (for instance, the reconstruction of the theatre affiliated with Moscow's Vakhtangov), transportation of goods, designing, consultations on design... The cooperative has opened branches in the Baltic republics, the Ukraine and the north of the country.

"Management is my



thing," Vadim Rosenbaum admits. "Although the road to my baby Fund was far from a straight one. After three years at a music college I had to leave because of a bad injury. I worked for a while as an administrator of concert programmes. Then at the beginning of this year I joined the cooperative Metal from which Fund virtually developed. I was elected chairman..."

"All forty members of the cooperative and the several

thousand with whom Fund has signed temporary contracts are highly-qualified specialists. Recognition of the high quality of our work was the recent notification we received from the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Trade and Commerce that we have been accepted as full members..."


"Management," Rosenbaum, "is collective. We all work a lot. But we earn 2-3 times more than we would have at a state enterprise... Not for nothing the cooperative has not existed since it was set up the direct participation of the Moscow branch of Soviet Cultural Fund. A from quarterly payment of the Cultural Fund (up to 10,000 rubles), we also provide children's homes with equipment and money, transfer considerable funds to concrete charities.

K. Elgin

cially revise his stand. For part, the government ought to find a common language with the Catholic Church. At the suggestion of Cardinal Obando y Bravo, Radio Catolica resumed broadcasts. The head of the Catholic Church in Nicaragua became the official mediator in talks between the government and the contras that began last January in Costa Rica. In addition, he chairs the National Reconciliation Commission, which includes representatives of the opposition parties in Nicaragua. He is called for more productive talks and an end to the war...

* * *

The one-man exhibition of the works of **Josef Bubak** in Bratislava has had a record number of visitors. The 38-year-old artist is one of the most striking representatives of modern art in Czechoslovakia. His work has been successfully exhibited in the U.R., Sweden and the U.S.A. Just under twenty years of



work, Bubak has produced not only excellent paintings and drawings, but also sculptures, mosaics, tapestries and stage sets.

"Artists are often classified by what they work with — brushes, charcoal or pencil.

That is meaningless," Josef Bubak said. "I choose the medium that allows me to express the essence of a phenomenon." The artist's aim is for people to see in his works not some kind of "average man," but a personality. "I grew up in the fifties when it was not the thing to use the singular 'I,' but only 'we.' Collectivism was pushed to the fore, and the individual remained in the shadows." Josef Bubak believes that the time has come to prize individuality, the uniqueness of each person.

Josef is threatened with the loss of his sight because of a rapidly progressing disease, which is why he is in such a hurry to do as much as possible...

Journalists are not sparing with their adjectives, especially if their subject is a film star. But not everyone has had as many showered on her as **Cherilyn Sarkisian** — Cher



Medusa. Cher Cleopatra. The many-faceted...

Fame came to her some 15 years ago, when the popularity of the duet Sonny and Cher soared. But her fame as a singer and the big money it brought her have not dampened her dream of acting in films, even though it was not to come true for many years. "The problem was," Cherilyn explained, "that people are quick to label you, without stopping to think of how valid the label is."

Cherilyn Sarkisian first demonstrated her talent as a serious actress in 1982 in a film directed by Robert Altman. That, she maintains, was when the battle for Hollywood started.

The dramatic role of a Californian drug addict, who was at the same time the loving mother of a crippled son, in Peter Bogdanovich's film "Mask," brought her the applause of audiences and a prize in Cannes, while the role of a Lesbian in Mike Nickols's "Silkwood" won her Oscar.

Journalists and then film critics began calling Cher a new Marilyn Monroe. The actress herself said: "Marilyn Monroe was an outstanding actress and at the same time an ordinary woman... Like Mae West, Hedy Lamarr or Ava Gardner. And other actresses, compared with whom I probably look like a new Mary Poppins."

Film critics are prone to portray Cherilyn as a sex star, but the actress herself rejects such a vulgar assessment.

outplay the ... coach

or **Yuri Sedykh**, the well-known hammer-thrower, the Olympic champion, the Seoul Games are his first tried himself out in his home town of L'opol. But his first attempt was a complete failure... then promised two of his school friends that he would "conquer" the hammer. He enrolled at the local sports school where he trained in the section of Vladimir Volovik. Soon the newcomer won a grading in the youth section, and then an adult rating. He finished secondary school as candidate Master of Sports, champion of his home town region, winning also first place in the republican and Union School Sports Spartakiad. He went on to study at the Kiev Institute of Physical Culture, and was coached by Anatoly Bondar-



chuk, 1972 Olympic games gold medallist.

After winning the junior European championship and the U.S.S.R. championship in 1976 Yuri Sedykh began training in earnest for the Olympics in Montreal. There one of his main rivals was his coach Anatoly Bondarchuk. The competition between them ended in a triumph for the pupil, while his coach won the bronze medal. In 1978 Yuri for the

first time became European champion. The hammer thrown at the 1980 Olympics has already on more than one occasion landed beyond the world record mark. Yuri again rose to the highest step of the Olympiad pedestal.

Since 1982 Yuri has repeatedly proved that he has no equals not only in the country and on the European continent, but in the whole world. The new world record he set has so far not been surpassed by anyone.

A. Kun



A 20-year operation over

Soviet and Polish security officers describe their counterintelligence Operation Boomerang against the Bandera Centre abroad.

The press conference organized in Kiev for Soviet and foreign journalists by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and the Ukrainian Journalists' Union took place on the morning of September 14. We had been told what the subject was and were eagerly awaiting the moment when the speakers would take their places at the table, brightly illuminated by a bank of lamps and searchlights.

In a few minutes' time the people from the state security bodies would put their cards on the table – ending an operation, that had involved the setting up under the leadership of S.I. Panchishin, a Lvov doctor, of a sham "underground nationalist group." The Bandera chiefs trusted the members of the group – Soviet patriots...

The first to speak was **Colonel Konstantin VYSOTSKY of the Ukrainian KGB**. He was one of the leaders of the operation.

"Many of you may not know what OUN stands for – it is the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Even before the war, when planning to set up an "independent" Ukraine, they had counted on Hitler. It was members of this organization who made up the punitive battalions Nachtigall and Roland that committed heinous crimes on the territory of Byelorussia, the Ukraine and Poland. Together with the nazis, Bandera's men killed almost 1,700,000 people in the Western regions of the Soviet Ukraine alone. At the end of the war, fearing for their lives, many of them fled abroad and settled chiefly in the U.S.A., the F.R.G., Canada and France.

OUN groups in foreign countries are financed by Western intelligence services,

continued the colonel. They have their headquarters in Munich.

The Bandera OUN differs from other Western nationalist organizations in its rabid anti-Sovietism and extremist forms of subversive work. Let me quote from their programme: "In its activities, the foreign-based OUN proceeds from the belief that history itself has placed on its shoulders the leadership of the liberation-revolutionary struggle for an 'independent Ukraine' and the abolition of the Bolshevik system. Our biggest enemy is stabilization of world relations, a balance of forces, détente, disarmament... Illegal communication channels with nationalist elements are needed (an underground organization is needed!)."

Actually, the operation began in Poland, when the attention of the security bodies fell on Tomasz Bilinski, an engineer, and a Ukrainian by nationality.

Major Aleksander MINKOWICZ of the Polish Ministry of the Internal Affairs:

We received information that the

Bandera organizations were interested in him. After repeated trips to the U.S. and Britain, Bilinski began looking for an opportunity to visit the U.S.S.R. When he left we asked our Ukrainian colleagues to keep an eye on him. A check confirmed our suspicions: he met with nationalist minded people.

Dr Svyatoslav PANCHISHIN:

My life was far from simple. I was born to a family of West Ukrainian intellectuals. For us 1939 was a memorable year. My uncle, Markiyan Panchishin, a well-known doctor in the city and Professor of Medicine, was, shortly after the reunification of the Ukrainian lands, elected to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. But the time of hope proved short. The war began. OUN bandits returned to Lvov together with the fascists and began hastily to restore the so-called "Ukrainian state" within the framework of the "new order." They weren't squeamish about their methods – they incited hatred for Communists and Jews, and tortured and executed people.

It was drummed into our heads that Ukrainians should side with the OUN and the "new order," otherwise they had no right to exist. In this situation the OUN leaders, when forming their puppet government, invited my uncle Markiyan Panchishin to be a member: that would have created the impression that the Ukrainian public, the intellectuals, supported the OUN. My uncle agreed. His name and



Panchishin's group was supplied with anti-Soviet literature, money, and spy equipment through secret channels

that of our whole family was widely used by the OUN leaders.

Many years passed. I had already forgotten the existence of OUN "fighters for an independent Ukraine." But they had not forgotten me. I understood why they were interested in me, but what did the Bandera followers from the West want of me? That question was answered after I met Bilinski. Instructions, orders, nationalist literature, money, radio, photo and film equipment began to come in from the foreign centre. The main thing they demanded was to set up illegal OUN structures, to keep the centre constantly supplied with military, political, economic and social information.

Colonel Konstantin Vysotsky:

One must give Svyatoslav Panchishin his due: he correctly assessed the actions of the Bandera recruiters and without hesitation reported everything to the KGB.

Taking into account the situation that had developed, together with the Polish security bodies, we decided not to cut off for a time the ties maintained by Bilinski and his accomplices, but to keep them under observation.

Svyatoslav Panchishin:

Later I began to make trips to Poland for personal meetings with representatives of the leader of the foreign-based OUN, Yaroslav Stetsko. From them I learned that our "underground" group was being run by a member of the Bandera Centre Vasili Oleskiv, who had fought in the SS Galizien Division and now lived in Britain. It was from him that I received the assignment to find a reliable man in Kiev who could provide information, as the Bandera leaders badly needed supporters in the capital of the republic. Together with the KGB we discussed the assignment and suggested to the centre the journalist Yuri Ivanchenko.

Journalist Yuri IVANCHENKO:

Some time later I was visited by a stranger of Ukrainian origin. He introduced himself as coming from my distant friends. He spoke of his immense desire to help the Ukraine and tried to find out whether I knew the "right" people. Soon afterwards he sent me an invitation to visit Poland. I learned that his name was Janek and that he was an accomplice of Tomasz Bilinski. His code name in the Bandera organization was Gordon and Bilinski's was Adam.

In Poland I met Gordon often and quickly realized that he was linked with foreign branches of the OUN in Britain and the F.R.G.

Before my departure I was introduced to the emissary of the London branch of the OUN, Tomasz Bilinski. He merits speaking of in greater detail. In the past he was a regular OUN official in the Lvov Region, a relative of the former chief of the OUN-UPA (Ukrainian Rebel Army) Roman Shukhevich. He maintained illegal organizational contacts with the chiefs of the foreign-based OUN, Yaroslav Stetsko, Vasili Oleskiv and Ilya Dmitriv. I know that they gave Bilinski the most challenging and delicate assignments. They trusted him to such an extent (and apparently he deserved their trust) that they even elected him to their government, the so-called "cabinet", appointing him deputy to the head of that "cabinet", Yaroslav Stetsko. I later learned that for his "outstanding" services Bilinski had been decorated with the Gold Cross of the OUN and the Stepan Bandera silver medal. Obviously this was largely a reward for his good "work" in the underground Panchishin group...

Dr Svyatoslav Panchishin:

Yuri is being too modest. In January 1980, we received a long letter from the national centre in which the leadership was full of praise for the work being done by Ivanchenko and me. We were informed that we had both been awarded Gold Crosses, and I also received the Stepan Bandera medal, which would remain temporarily in the safes of the centre... I was also promoted: the letter announced my appointment as chairman of the "supreme OUN court" in the Ukraine and, simultaneously, chief of the "security service" in the Ukraine.

Colonel Konstantin Vysotsky:

Thanks to the help of comrades Panchishin, Ivanchenko and certain other Soviet patriots, the subversive activities of the foreign-based OUN against the Soviet Union and Poland were effectively neutralized. Just one detail: as a result of their work we were able to identify and neutralize the actions of more than 20 emissaries, among whom were citizens of the U.S., Britain, the F.R.G. and France. Naturally the OUN regularly received from Panchishin's group "reliable" information on which our people had worked hard.

Major Alexander MINKOVICH:

There was, in my opinion, one extremely important episode in the operation. In the various OUN documents we often came across the code name Wanda. But who was Wanda? We established that it was Vasili Oleskiv, who today heads the Bandera OUN.

Both the KGB and ourselves knew perfectly well that by supporting the control-

led activities of Bilinski, we were increasing Vasili Oleskiv's chances of becoming heir to the leader of the OUN, Yaroslav Stetsko, who was suffering from an incurable illness.

But then Bilinski died in 1983. The question we were interested in was would the Bandera group make more active use of Gordon - Janek, or look for another replacement for Stefan - Bilinski's code name. They chose Gordon. It became clear that the Western centres would for a long time depend on the Ukrainians in Poland and the U.S.S.R.

Although Gordon lacked sufficient experience, he continued to work with great energy. At present Gordon has been detained.

After the death of Stetsko in 1986, the Ukrainian KGB took care that the Panchishin group should express its attitude to the sad event. A letter of condolence was prepared and sent to Wanda through controlled channels. Its effect surpassed all expectations: in July 1987, at the opening of the monument to Stetsko at a cemetery in Munich on the first anniversary of his death, Vasili Oleskiv read the letter out in full to the assembled nationalists and numerous guests.

In October the VIIth rally of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists elected Oleskiv its leader. I think he largely owes his promotion to us...

Dr Svyatoslav Panchishin:

In June of this year Oleskiv personally organized through his emissary, Lyubov Shtokalo, the delivery to me, Yuri Ivanchenko and our "accomplices" of a large number of organizational documents adopted at the VIIth Council. Most of them, as before, were confidential.

The documents say that in view of the political and ideological changes taking place in the U.S.S.R., the foreign-based OUN has assumed the extremely important responsibility for a coup not only in the Ukraine but throughout the Soviet Union.

Colonel Konstantin Vysotsky:

Together with our Polish comrades we have decided to conclude our joint operation and make the material we have collected available to the widest sections of the public in order to reveal once again the true face of the Bandera leaders, and the utter hopelessness of the plans of the Western intelligence services and the OUN centres they finance.

**Report from the press conference by
our special correspondent
Anatoly SHLIYENKOV**



A yearly subscription for the winner.

New Times meets its readers

Saturday at the Exhibition of the U.S.S.R.'s Economic Achievements in Moscow. The Grenada, Floctus and other music groups, clowns and colourful parades. So opened Soviet Magazines Week. True, New Times' editors had had no hand in organizing it. We were to meet our readership on New Times Day in the Soviet Trade Unions Pavilion.

Our regular contributors, for whom glasnost is a very human urge and not an opportunist one, were invited to what can be described as round-table discussions. There was no prearranged agenda, no presentation of pap-

ers, but a veritable barrage of questions on every subject under the sun, answered as each contributor saw fit.

When one elderly gentleman accused the media of attacking "our great leader, comrade Stalin," he was booed.

On the other hand, college student Dombrovsky said he had been disturbed by the recent U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Presidium edict on meetings and demonstrations, which had been passed without any preliminary nationwide discussion.

In a note that we found rather moving an engineer from the Volga town of Togliatti wrote: "You know what made me come here? The thought that the media might again fall silent."


Most people react painfully to such aggressively conservative outbursts as the notorious article by Nina Andreyeva. Indeed, the Number One question, to which we still can't provide a satisfactory reply, is why the central newspapers said nothing about it for a full three weeks.

Otherwise, answers were in the nature of reflections and the statement of a definite creed. "To judge from the notes received," economist Anatoly Butenko said, "some people in the audience think that in this country Stalinism was a historically inevitable phenomenon. I person-



ally categorically reject such fatalism, which in the long run implies lack of faith in perestroika." When he added that he wholeheartedly believed in perestroika, to abandon which would be ruinous to the Soviet Union, there was stormy applause.

Citing specific instances, author Arkady Sakhnin described how corruption had emerged and spread in the past in the various echelons of power. When writer Vladimir Dudintsev was asked what he thought of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, he said: "He was forcibly deported for writing the truth about Stalinism when doing so was banned. I cannot say anything about what he has written since. I hear it said that he is not always right, which could well be. However, we must first speak of the people who are to blame for what was done to him."

We editors of New Times are grateful to our readership for their support, which they express in letters, advice and hard-hitting



Vladimir Dudintsev
Arkady Sakhnin
Frankly speaking...




criticism. We would like them to contribute energetically to Glasnost and other columns.

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


Fourth-former Artyom Barsky also won a yearly subscription for his knowledgeable answers to the tough political quiz organized by New Times at the Exhibition.



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